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What most of us regard as traditional development assistance will 
undoubtedly continue to be important for very many poor developing 
countries for many years to come. But unless we also pave the way for 
greater economic activity and value creation in these countries, it will not be 
possible to meet the overarching target of the UN Millennium Development 
Goals: to halve the number of people living in extreme poverty by 2015. We 
therefore have to keep two things in mind at once. Development can only take 
place where there is a well-functioning state and a well-functioning business 
sector. Neither is sufficient on its own… This means that the development of 
the business sector will be a high priority focus area for the Government in its 
international development cooperation... In addition to the expertise and 
experience to be found in public bodies, it is also vital to draw on the 
experience and knowledge of the Norwegian oil industry, NGOs and the 
media. We have made good progress in the coordination between the 
authorities, and we are now ready to include Norwegian oil companies and 
NGOs in this effort (Solheim 2006).1 
 
Much has happened in the world over the last few decades and the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Jonas Gahr Støre has therefore initiated a project that creates discussion about the 
direction of a new Norwegian foreign policy, the so called Refleks project2. It is becoming 
more difficult to see a clear separation between foreign policy agenda and the development 
agenda. Development policy has its own minister, Erik Solheim, but must still be seen as a 
branch of foreign policy. “There has for a long time been a political goal to increase the 
cooperation between the state and Norwegian business actors that operates abroad” (PCC 
2008:61). As early as 1961, the Engenutvalg stated that Norwegian business actors had the 
potential to play an important role in Norwegian development work (Kielland 2008). This 
makes it interesting to study the interface and the relationship between public and private in 
development policy, which will be the focus in this thesis. Increasing involvement of 
business will lead to more influence from transnational corporations (TNCs) on Norwegian 
policy and practice. There is a growing consciousness in Norway that actors in both the oil 
and gas industry and the Government must play on the same team to maintain Norway’s 
existing good reputation. Støre (2007) says in a speech to the management of StatoilHydro: 
“Today, you need to come up with good answers – because the world cares, and because the 
reputations of Statoil, Hydro and Norway are at stake at the same time.” 
 
                                                 
1 See also the NHO  report from 2003 “Norwegian development cooperation policy – why should the 
Norwegian private sector be involved?” http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=2390  
2 See http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks.html?id=474693  
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There is a global trend that the power of the state is weakening and TNCs and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are becomeing more important and powerful. For 
example, StatoilHydro pays more than NOK 3 billion in taxes to Angola. In comparison, the 
Norwegian development budget for Angola is around NOK 150 million and for the whole of 
Africa South of the Sahara it is around NOK 4.5 billion (PCC 2008:98). The obvious 
problem with incorporating private actors in development initiatives is that they have their 
own agenda and cannot be forced into acting according to official Norwegian political 
targets. However, a politician (2) says that feedback and evaluation from the UN in general, 
and John Ruggie3 specifically, are that Norwegian TNCs have highly developed thoughts on 
social responsibility and partnership with public institutions. 
 
Norwegian development policy in increasingly understood as part of a political agenda, not 
just philanthropy. The Norwegian Government wants to focus its development projects in 
fields where Norway has high knowledge levels and resources. This thesis will use the 
Norwegian Action Plan for Environment in Development Cooperation as a starting point 
(hereinafter referred to as the `Action Plan´ (2006)). In white paper number 35 (2003-2004) 
the Storting asked the Government to develop this Action Plan, which was published in 
2006, to produce one document that combined the Norwegian effort on environmental 
development cooperation. A source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) states that this 
document is a guide for the Government’s daily work on development policy (22). Since the 
1980s, with Gro Harlem Brundtland’s report Our Common Future, Norway has aimed to 
become a leading nation within climate and environment. The parliamentary agreement on 
climate states that all political parties, with the exception of Fremskrittspartiet, agree that 
Norway should be a leading nation on environmental development work (Klimaforliket 
2008). This is a way of empowering Norway’s role in international society, and will be done 
with the use of Norwegian industry and firms profiling Norway. The Action Plan states 
several areas where Norway will focus its work. This thesis will focus mainly on climate and 
access to clean energy. Climate change is a transboundary environmental problem and 
mitigating climate change is an important part of development work because it is the poorest 
people that suffer the most from global warming.  
                                                 
3 Since 2005, Ruggie has served as the United Nations Special Representative on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sga934.doc.htm  
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1.1 Research question and design  
This leads to my research question: 
What can explain the Norwegian Government’s promotion of StatoilHydro as an 
agent of Norway’s energy and climate policies in Brazil inspite of their different 
goals?  
 
This study seeks to evaluate StatoilHydro’s influence on the output side of Norwegian 
environmental development policy. Formulated policy sometimes differs from implemented 
policy initiatives. In this case, the Government has no formulated policy on how to promote 
StatoilHydro in relation to environmental development policy. However, the Norwegian 
political practice is to promote StatoilHydro as an agen of Norway’s energy and climate 
policies in Brazil. StatoilHydro is Norway’s biggest and most powerful energy company, 
which can imply influence on Norwegian initiatives on energy and climate. The Government 
has a substantial ownership in StatoilHydro, but because it has little influence on the 
governance of StatoilHydro, I will treat the company as a private actor. The dependent 
variable is chosen to be governmental decision to promote StatoilHydro as a Norwegian 
agent in realizing energy and climate initiatives in Brazil. There are probably various factors 
and explainations for change in the dependent variable which will not be covered in this 
work. This thesis is based on the following hypothesis: 
H1: The Norwegian Government has promoted StatoilHydro as an agent of 
Norway’s energy and climate policies in Brazil due to StatoilHydro’s power.   
 
H1 is founded on the assumption that power can lead to influence. Empirical findings which 
substantiate that StatoilHydro has considerable power and uses this power will strengthen 
H1. Conversely, findings indicating that StatoilHydro has limited power and little 
opportunity to benefit from its power will indicate that H1has little credibility.  
 
I will explain wheter StatoilHydro’s power over the Government changes Norwegian 
political practice in Brazil. The explanation for why the Government promotes StatoilHydro 
as an agent of Norway’s energy and climate policies is based on the company’s power 
foundation. The research question is studied based on the model outlined below (see figure 
1.1). I argue that StatoilHydro can have an effect on the dependent variable through two 
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sources of power: power resources and power activities. StatoilHydro’s power resources 
deal with power relating to its resource position while power activities are the company’s 
executive power.There is reason to believe that StatoilHydro holds these types of power 
through various channels. The different channels of power are demonstrated by reference to 
the case of Brazil.  
 
  
Figure 1.1: Research model  
 
This work is based on the assumption that power renders probable influence. The more 
power StatoilHydro holds, the more reason to argue that the company has influence. It 
cannot be concluded that power leads to influence, but it is an indication for StatoilHydro’s 
potential ability to influence. The analysis of StatoilHydro’s effect on the dependent variable 
is separated into two parts. First, in chapter 5 and 6, I address two important areas. First, I 
explain how StatoilHydro is supported by the Norwegian Government and promoted as a 
Norwegian agent in Brazil. Second, I analyze StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil compared to 
six formulated policy targets in the Action Plan to see if StatoilHydro’s activities are 
contradictory to governmental policy. The second part, chapter 7, analyzes the different 
channels where StatoilHydro holds power, illustrating how the company has received 
governmental support despite that StatoilHydro’s interests not necessarily corresponds to the 
Government’s formulated objectives. Figure 1.1 is thereby the starting point for studying the 
political role of StatoilHydro in the process from formulated policy to the implementation of 
the policy in practice.  
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1.2 Justification of the research question  
This research question is relevant for several reasons. First, the growing dependency on 
private actors combined with the lack of regulation make society dependent on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). CSR is a trend that 
seems to change some firms’ behavior in good economic times, but it will not automatically 
work the same way in the long run. It will be interesting to follow the CSR trend in the 
process and aftermath of the current financial crisis. Society has become more dependent on 
the market that spreads its mechanisms and functions to other parts of society, such as 
climate and energy policy. The importance of private actors leaves an indistinct line between 
the state and the market, which should be thoroughly analyzed from different perspectives.  
The Brundtland report claims that TNCs have a special responsibility for sustainable 
development (Brundtland Commission 1987).  
 
Second, there is probably a lack of dialogue and communication between the public and 
private sectors. This means that the Government arranges business deals for Norwegian 
companies such as StatoilHydro, with companies in the host countries, in the absence of 
clear and in-depth discussion between the Government and StatoilHydro. It is important that 
PPPs also benefit the public and if the Norwegian Government wants to start a closer 
partnership with private actors it is dependent on knowledge about problems and 
opportunities related to such cooperation. Kielland (2008) states that, except from his master 
thesis, there have been no studies in political science in the last 15 years on the relationship 
between development aid authority and the business sector. In addition, the democracy 
debate requests knowledge about who is a premise provider in such a partnership. The 
conclusions from such research could be helpful for the design of Norwegian policy and 
practice in the coming years.  
 
Third, the emerging importance of energy supply combined with the risk of climate change 
is an area requiring urgent action. The International Energy Agency (IEA) states that the 
global energy demand will increase by 59% from 2006 to 2030 (in Lindseth 2007:20). If the 
intensified climate initiatives and subsidizing of renewable energy are taken into account, the 
demand for fossil fuels will increase by 50% by 2030 (Lunde et. al. 2008:38). The important 
issues for Norway will be the scarcity, politicizing of and competition for oil and gas 
resources (ibid.). The global emission of climate gas has increased by 70% over the last 40 
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years, and the energy sector is responsible for the highest increase – 145% (Alfsen 2008). 
The Government says that climate is today’s most important political issue, but it is 
problematic to act upon. The climate and energy dilemma can be exemplified by the 
petroleum versus renewables debate. It is a dilemma which, on one side, involves continuing 
expansion and internationalization of the Norwegian oil and gas industry and, on the other 
side, developing Norway into a leading climate nation (Lunde et al. 2008:207-208). The role 
of oil companies as a contributor to today’s climate problem has been widely discussed.4 
Moreover, the Norwegian energy sector has a competitive advantage on subsea extraction 
and carbon capture and storage (CCS) and is responsible for a large share of Norway’s 
exports.  
 
Fourth, there is a demand to question the power and influence of the largest company in 
Norway, StatoilHydro. The petroleum industry is often seen as one united industry, but it is 
also important to remember that the companies are competitors (34). Oil and gas companies 
have resources and budgets comparable to those of small countries. To demonstrate: 19 out 
of the 25 biggest companies on the Oslo stock exchange are related to the energy industry 
(6). A source in the MFA says that “Norwegian policy is to promote Norwegian business 
interests” (26). However, business activities are not always subject to evaluation, to assess if 
they are in accordance with Norwegian development policy. Solheim (2008c) says that “we 
have to see the development policy as a whole”. This makes it especially interesting to 
examine if StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil are in accordance with Norwegian interests 
formulated by the Government. Despite StatoilHydro being a commercial oil company, it is 
also the Norwegian state’s oil company, and therefore has a special role in Norwegian 
foreign policy.  
 
Finally, the Norwegian Government is currently a three-party coalition and would be 
characterized as a socialist government. Its political ideology corresponds to the Brazilian 
Government’s views. Brazil is the main Norwegian focus area in Latin America and there is 
a political brotherhood between the two governments. For example, both countries are 
engaged in questions about the power relationship between developed and developing 
countries. There is a considerable focus on Norway’s reputation and StatoilHydro is 
probably the most important company reflecting that reputation in Brazil. StatoilHydro has 
                                                 
4 For example, lawyers in the US and UK try to find ways to sue oil companies for the part they played in accelerating 
climate change. This is similar to what happened to the tobacco industry (Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006:232). 
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developed a close relationship with Petrobras and the aggregated bilateral cooperation 
between Norway and Brazil is increasing. The newly established Norwegian Latin America 
Research Network5 also shows the increasing Norwegian focus in this region.   
 
1.3 Norwegian environmental development policy 
“Environmental concerns should permeate everything Norway does” (politician (34)).  
 
There is a growing consensus that supply of energy is the key to development. To combine 
this growing energy demand and the risk of global climate change there must be a 
considerable focus on making energy more environmentally friendly. The Norwegian 
Government supports StatoilHydro politically and financially to increase production 
internationally. Internationally, gas is seen as a solution to reducing climate gases, measured 
in carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent units, because it is a better option than coal. The 
Norwegian petroleum industry has lower CO2 emissions per produced unit of oil and gas, 
and StatoilHydro is seen as a front runner in developing CCS technology. 
Internationalization of StatoilHydro is argued to be an act of solidarity for developing 
countries in need of climate friendly energy. In addition to using StatoilHydro as a climate 
initiative, the international Norwegian climate focus is mainly based on deforestation.  
 
Many oil exporting countries have worked against international climate agreements and 
refuse to commit to emissions reductions (Lunde et al. 2008:208). At an OECD side event in 
December 2007, the Norwegian Minister of Finance, Kristin Halvorsen (2007), said “In 
Norway we recognize that it is in our own best interest to fight climate change even if our 
income from oil and gas exports could be hit. Long run sustainability cannot be traded 
against short run profits”. The Norwegian policy can be described as `a golden middle way´, 
which is based on Energi 21, the agreement on climate, OG21 and the Norwegian Action 
Plan (Energirådet 2008). Norway has expressed its desire to be at the forefront and to be an 
initiative taker since the beginning of the focus on climate change. This has led to 
international attention being placed on Norwegian emissions and policy development. The 
dramatic increase in the focus on climate change will lead to a larger percentage of aid 
money being directed towards environmental development work (Lunde et al. 2008:143).  
                                                 




The Action Plan has identified climate change and access to clean energy as one of its four 
thematic priorities. The central theme in the Action Plan is that climate change is a serious 
threat which Norway must act upon, in both domestic and foreign policy. The MFA states in 
the input to evaluation of the Action Plan that it can be professionally impossible to separate 
energy and climate initiatives and hence suggests reporting on combined environmental 
achievements. Furthermore, the private sector is argued to have a vital role because of its 
increased focus on CSR, development of low-carbon technology and investment in cleaner 
energy. StatoilHydro is not mentioned in the inputs to the Action Plan, but it is said that the 
energy sector, specifically oil and biofuel, is particularly important in relation to integrating 
environmental initiatives.  
Selected targets in the Action Plan concerning climate and access to clean energy: 
1. Increased technical cooperation with rapidly expanding countries like Brazil 
2. Provide better access to reliable energy services  
3. Enable use of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)  
4. Increased use of renewable energy 
5. Increased investment in low-carbon technology  
6. Improved energy efficiency   
 
The Action Plan’s direct effect on implemented Norwegian development policy can be 
widely discussed because other political documents can also be important. Furthermore, the 
implementation of policy does not usually correspond entirely with political documents. It is 
said that politics is usually not created based on elucidation and public policy documents 
(Wildavsky 1973 in Sverdrup 2007:92). This is particularly relevant in development policy. 
It is, however, my impression that the Action Plan creates the basis for environmental 
development work. As an extension of the Action Plan, Erik Solheim (2008; 2008b) stresses 
that Norway has four target areas for its policy on climate: CCS, Shipping, rain forest and 
the area around the poles. A source at the MFA (22), who took part in the development of 
the Action Plan, says that CCS was not a technology known to those developing the Action 
Plan. However, investment in low-carbon technology and rain forest are focus areas in the 
Action Plan, and will be dealt with in this thesis. The deforestation target has its focus on 
Brazil and belongs in two thematic priority areas in the Plan. It is an initiative under 
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sustainable management of biological diversity and natural resources, and also climate 
change and access to clean energy. Investment in the Brazilian rain forest is a substantial part 
of the Norwegian CO2 reduction target. Emission trading has become one of the most 
important political instruments in climate policy (Lunde et. al. 2008:129).  
 
The Policy Coherence Committee (PCC 2008:84) emphasizes the importance of considering 
energy and climate issues as both integrated and also in relation to each other. However, 
Gard Lindseth argues that Norway will not be able to fulfil its own environmental 
commitments nationally and internationally because of our oil and gas production (URL 1). 
In an MFA report Lunde et. al. (2008:114) point out that there are several dilemmas 
connected with a carbon dependent world when facing the threat of climate change. Lunde 
et. al. describe two different approaches to this. First, exploit the oil and gas resources as 
effectively as possible to reduce emissions, reduce flaring of gas and develop CCS 
technology. The MFA report stresses that the world will be dependent on oil, that produced 
energy in Norway has a considerably lower level of CO2 emissions than the world average, 
and that Norway’s best initiative is on CCS and other oil and gas related actions. This means 
that internationalizing the oil and gas industry is seen as one of Norway’s most effective 
ways of cutting global CO2 emissions (Ibid:128).  Following this argument, some emphasize 
that Norway is, and should be seen as, a trustworthy and dependable exporter of oil and gas. 
This gives Norway some degree of `petro-power´ (Hansen 2008).  
 
Second, Lunde’s alternative approach is to create a means of developing a Norwegian 
economy and community that is not based on fossil fuels to the same degree (Lunde et al. 
2008:150). This involves investing and focusing on becoming an environmentaly frindly 
energy nation with increased research and development in renewable energy sources. The oil 
and gas industry is of course fighting for the first option. Option one is a very possible 
outcome because some of the new political documents, such as the Refleks Report, 
repeatedly use the arguments of the oil industry about Norway being an environmentally 
conscious petroleum nation (Ibid:209). However, it has been difficult to find clarification of 
Norwegian energy interests in the public domain. Lunde et al. realize that this might imply a 
lack of open and democratic processes related to development of energy policy. They say 
that “the climate debate has until 2007 not had any effect on administration of Norwegian oil 
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resources worth mentioning” (Ibid:121)6. Climate policy has never been a threat to the oil 
and gas industry, although the oil and gas industry has been responsible for approximately 
25% of Norwegian CO2 emissions in recent years (Lindseth 2007:15). This has happened 
despite parliament resolving to stabilize CO2 emissions to 1990 levels and also committing 
to the Kyoto protocol. The Policy Coherence Committee (PCC 2008:103) argues that this 
target can only be accomplished by not exploiting all the oil and gas available in the fields. 
However, the oil industry has pointed out that gas is actually seen as an environmentally 
friendly product in most countries, although it is seen as the problem rather than the solution 
in Norway (Lunde et al. 2008:148). The use of gas in power plants leads to 50% of the CO2 
emissions compared to coal and therefore creates a climate profile for gas (Hansen 2008). 
Norway’s, and StatoilHydro’s, expertise in gas could provide Norway with a role in 
supplying developing countries with gas as an alternative to coal. As demonstrated, 
Norwegian climate policy is to some extent focused on climate solutions related to 
petroleum. 
 
The Government needs to develop guidelines for what Norway should do if different parts of 
its foreign policy are contradictory. “Sometimes one has to choose between two objectives 
that alone are good… and then one stands in front of a dilemma, a contradiction between two 
different considerations which only to some extent can be moderated, but never totally 
solved”  (Lunde et al. 2008:202). For example, Norwegian environmental policy could 
threaten StatoilHydro’s position in highly prioritized projects, such as Peregrino in Brazil. 
This is a dilemma the oil industry is conscious about and it therefore uses resources to 
demonstrate that the oil industry is sustainable and can be developed into an industry for 
renewable energy (Ibid:210).  
 
Arne Kjell Raustøl (in Jørgensen 2008) says that there is increasingly more discussion about 
how Norwegian aid can promote Norwegian interests and competence. Norwegian interests 
have become more important under Erik Solheim as Minister of Development. National 
interest is closely connected to an idea of who we are and a common national identity. We 
have to know something about who we are before we can say anything about our interests 
(Huntington 1997 in Sverdrup 2007). It seems impossible to get a clear and defined picture 
of what national interests are (Sande Lie 2007:104). National interests also consist of 
                                                 
6 See Nilsen, Yngve (2001) ”En Felles Plattform? Norsk oljeindustri og klimadebatten i Norge frem til 1998” for in-depth 
discussion about the Norwegian oil industry’s relationship to the climate debate.  
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contradictory interests, which leads to a dilemma about what will be the best solution for as 
many as possible. In addition to this uncertainty about national interest – and maybe because 
of it – theoretical approaches have tended to avoid using the term. Constructivism and post-
structuralism disagree with the term because it gives an impression about objective interests. 
On the other side, rational actor approaches redefined the term so that interests are identified 
with subjective preferences (Sundstøl Eriksen 2007). Sundstøl Eriksen points out that the 
term makes it impossible to separate morally motivated and interest guided actions. Moral 
implication can be contrary to what are seen as economic interests. Solheim has worked hard 
to convince people that almost all aid and development work is in Norway’s own interest.  
1.4 The argumentation and the structure of the thesis  
The thesis will be divided into eight chapters. The following will outline the essence of each 
chapter. The next chapter, chapter 2, focuses on the process that will lead to the conclusion. 
It will explain the use of different methods and perform an evaluation of how the data is 
collected. This part argues that the best answer to the research question demands a 
qualitative case study based on interviews. I will account for choosing StatoilHydro in Brazil 
as my case and point to some problems I experienced in studying StatoilHydro’s power.   
 
Chapter 3 is an explanation of theoretical perspectives that are relevant in answering the 
research question. The theoretical framework is the supporting structure around which my 
thesis will be built. Due to the nature of the topic at hand, the thesis straddles a variety of 
disciplines and approaches. Political science, business management, economics, sociology 
and communication science have all made contributions relevant to this research question. 
Within political science, scholars in international relations, in particular international 
political economy, political theory, comparative politics and public policy, have all analyzed 
questions related to the research objective. Therefore, this analysis will utilize a wide range 
of literature and approaches. Much of political economy theory highlights the emerging role 
of TNCs in international politics and describes the relationship between politics and 
economics as becoming increasingly entwined in an era of increased political and 
economical interconnectedness. Based on this theory, I argue that StatoilHydro can be 
analyzed according to its power resources and power activities. Therefore, it should be 




Chapter 4 puts the internationalization of StatoilHydro into a historical context.  
 
Chapter 5 explains the empirical findings in the specific case of Norwegian environmental 
development cooperation in Brazil. I focus on explaining StatoilHydro’s role and activities 
in Brazil. Furthermore, I give an account of the Norwegian Government’s support for 
StatoilHydro in Brazil through the embassy, political delegations and INTSOK.  
 
Chapter 6 evaluates StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil. It illustrates that the interest of 
StatoilHydro differs significantly from the Norwegian Government’s interests, as they are 
formulated in the Action Plan. This evaluation points out that StatoilHydro contributes 
positively to some political targets. At the same time, I argue that governmental financial and 
political support for StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil should be re-evaluated because major 
parts of StatoilHydro’s activities are contradictory to Norwegian policy in the Action Plan.  
   
Chapter 7 is based on the conclusion of chapter 6 – that StatoilHydro’s activities do not 
necessarily contribute to realizing Norwegian policy targets on environmental development 
policy. This chapter analyzes StatoilHydro’s power as an explanation for why StatoilHydro 
is promoted as an agent of Norway’s energy and climate policies in Brazil. I argue that 
StatoilHydro has influenced the Government in the process from formulated policy to 
development practice in a way that negatively affects the realization of Norwegian energy 
and climate targets and threatens the Norwegian reputation.   
   
Chapter 8 outlines the main findings and conclusion of the study. The chapter also outlines 
implications of using StatoilHydro as an actor in development work. I argue that the 
Government needs to obtain a better understanding of StatoilHydro’s and other TNCs’ 
power influence if business is to contribute positively in environmental development work.      
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2. Reflections on methods 
 
It should not be an objective of this study to find and discover scandals, but rather to learn 
about StatoilHydro’s channels of power and how they can affect Norwegian energy and 
climate initiatives in Brazil. It is also important to note that the thesis is not a political 
document. I am not saying that one of the options is right or the other one is wrong. I am a 
researcher and “researchers are usually bad politicians” (Sverdrup 2007). I emphasize the 
arguments and the possible implications.  
2.1 Qualitative case study 
Because of the complexity of this field of study and the lack of previous research, I have 
chosen to use a qualitative case study. Qualitative case studies seldom give definitive 
answers with high levels of security, because these interpretations are open to subjectivity. 
Therefore, this thesis will focus on analyzing and pointing out trends and possible 
conclusions. It is more fruitful to focus on finding trends and mechanisms through an 
analysis rather than trying to statistically measure the power of StatoilHydro. It is important 
to point out that there is a lack of studies on the political role and the power of TNCs, which 
makes it a challenging field to study but also a highly interesting one.  
 
A task for any social scientist conducting a case study is to place the study within a greater 
research field. Generalization does not necessarily mean finding universal laws. The 
objective of generalization is usually to formulate concepts, theories and clarify causal 
relations that are valid under certain conditions. Case studies do not generalize based on 
statistical representativety, but rather on analytical and theoretical representativety 
(Andersen 1997). Generalization from this work applies more to large business actors 
operating in markets with a high degree of international competition than for small 
businesses in local markets. StatoilHydro is, as argued, a political agent and the results from 
this study can be the basis for studying the political power of all Norwegian TNCs operating 
in countries where the Norwegian Government has development initiatives. This study can 
create the basis for wider research on the political agency of TNCs. It can therefore be 
relevant for other TNCs in the energy sector and especially for state owned companies. 
Internationally, the research is relevant for other oil companies. However, StatoilHydro has a 
unique position in Norway and the opportunity to generalize from this case must therefore 
not be exaggerated.  
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Brazil is one of the countries given the most attention in the Action Plan because Norway 
wants to focus on countries that have some existing CO2 emissions and are expected to 
rapidly increase them. Brazil is a developing country with several social challenges. It is also 
one of the world’s richest countries in terms of natural resources and one of the leading 
countries in the area of renewable energy. Many Norwegian companies have operations 
there already, and that number is growing. Both Statoil and Hydro have been present in Rio 
de Janeiro, the Brazilian oil capital, for some years and have now merged into StatoilHydro. 
Brazil could become the country that receives the most Norwegian aid in the coming years. 
Depending on the success of the rain forest fund, Norway will give up to NOK 717 million 
per year between 2010 and 2015. In comparison, in 2007 Sudan received the most 
Norwegian aid, with a total of NOK 701 million (Development Today 2008). “Norway is the 
first country in the world to contribute to President Lula da Silva’s Amazon protection fund. 
It has pledged USD 1 billion through 2015. This includes USD 100 million in the first year 
and USD 600 million in the following year” (Nygaard 2008). At the same time, the 
Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg announced that Norway wishes to take part in 
the development of the Brazilian oil fields. Brazil has discovered significant oil reserves in 
recent years and the importance of Brazil as an oil and gas country has increased rapidly. 
StatoilHydro is the leading oil company in Norway and is among the ten largest oil 
companies in the world. It is the largest company in the Nordic countries and among the 50 
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largest in the world (Kullerud 2008). StatoilHydro has activities in more than 40 countries 
(StatoilHydro 2008c). In Brazil, StatoilHydro is both politically and financially supported by 
the Norwegian Government, which I will come back to later. In its input to the Action Plan, 
the MFA states that climate consequences of all initiatives financed by Norway will be 
evaluated. This also involves future prospective emissions.   
2.3 Interviews and data collection  
When deciding on what methods and design to use one must consider access to empirical 
data and how the data will illustrate the research question. I believe in using different 
approaches and combining methods. My original ambition was to undertake field research in 
Brazil. However, after consultation with various advisers I decided to carry out the research 
from Norway. Because of the focus on the interaction between the Norwegian Government 
and StatoilHydro, I would argue that the benefit of conducting research in Brazil would have 
been less than that achieved through focusing on interviews in Norway. The thesis is based 
on an extensive sample of documents, informants and observations. I finally received 
approval for access to insight into the documents relating to the Action Plan, which gave me 
the valuable opportunity to understand the process and the actors involved in developing the 
Action Plan and the inputs to the evaluation.  
 
The informants consist of two politicians, two representatives from the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (MPE), six from the MFA, one from the Ministry of the Environment 
(ME), five from StatoilHydro, three from interest organizations, five academics, one 
business representative and one consultant. It was an objective to get the informants to 
explain and reflect on StatoilHydro’s political power in general, and StatoilHydro’s role in 
Brazil specifically. Most of the interviews were performed confidentially to encourage the 
informants to talk openly. The interview objects will therefore be referred to using numbers. 
Most of the interviews followed a theme guide (appendix 2) and were recorded on tape. The 
recorded content was reviewed at the end of the work. In addition to the twenty-six 30 to 60 
minute interviews, I have had conversations and email correspondence with various 
individuals, the information from which will be treated in the same confidential manner. All 
interviews were conducted in 2008. The informants have different agendas and their 
statements must be seen as their subjective opinion rather than the objective truth. In places 
in the text where I believe it is adequate and appropriate, I will point out who the informant 
is representing. Some of the data presented are also based on observations from various 
 21
seminars, workshops, conferences and meetings (See appendix 1). I am satisfied with the 
information I have acquired through my interviews. I have been privileged and had the 
chance to interview many important individuals. There have, however, been some 
challenges.  
2.4 Problems related to studying power 
The relevant Norwegian ministers have not agreed to meet with me due to time constraints. I 
have, however, obtained answers to some of my questions by asking them at conferences or 
seminars where the ministers were speaking. I have had good level of contact with 
StatoilHydro during the entire work process. The only restriction from their side has been 
that my contact with StatoilHydro Brazil had to be made through the communications 
manager for the South Atlantic Basin. Norwegian Oil and Gas Partners (INTSOK) has also 
been helpful in giving interviews and allowing me to observe some of its events. However, 
when confronted with questions about INTSOK’s role in Brazil, the INTSOK representative 
in Brazil did not get approval by the administration of INTSOK in Norway to answer my 
questions. The thesis will therefore give the impression that it is difficult to obtain in-depth 
analyses on questions relating to power and influence. 
 
During the scope of the study I used various interview techniques. When asked open 
questions the informants tend to talk around the issue. Direct questions either led to useful 
answers or the informant refusing to answer the question at all. When confronted with 
statements, the informants sometimes reacted as if they were being accused and became 
agitated. People tended to be uncomfortable addressing issues relating to terms such as 
lobbying, influence and political power. Many informants pointed out that some of what they 
said was a personal viewpoint and not the view of the organization they represent. Difficult 
questions were sometimes avoided by referring to other people in the organization. The 
technique which has produced the most effective results was to start the interview with facts 
and background information and continue by using information from other informants to 
confront the interviewee.  
2.5 Line of action: a step-by-step process 
To begin my work, I undertook an in-depth study of the literature on TNCs’ role in 
international relations, Norwegian environmental development work, StatoilHydro and 
Brazil. From this, I developed a plan for who I wanted to interview and the areas I wanted 
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information about. These initial interviews gave me new insights about what type of 
informants and information were relevant for studying StatoilHydro’s power and effect on 
the dependent variable. This process was repeated iteratively, with the result that my 
questions varied from individual to individual, depending on what point in the process they 
were interviewed and their role and background. The information I acquired became more 
and more relevant as I moved through the process. The same can be said about the 
informants. This step-by-step process comprising literature studies, observations and 
interviews has led to a framework for studying the political power of TNCs. Parts of the 
theory are built on existing theory and parts are based on my own studies and information 
from the interviews. This means that the information from the interviewees is not perfectly 
comparable. I wanted to focus on the interviewees’ particular competence areas rather than 
the comparability of the interview content. The thesis should be used to understand the 
situation that has been studied and will give an indication as to the existence of truth in the 
hypothesis. Because of my methodological approach, there is reason to believe that the 
informants have affected the research and the results may have been different if the research 




















3. Theoretical approach to the relationship between TNCs 
and home government 
TNCs have been studied extensively in economic terms and it is now time to make room for 
TNCs in political debates as well. Jeff Harrod is of the opinion that the twenty-first century 
will be the century of the corporation. Harrods argues that “the real source of power of the 
corporation in the twenty-first century is its increased influence within the governments of 
key states in the global political structure” (Harrod 2006:29). The growing belief in the 
increasing power and influence of TNCs on governments creates a demand for research on 
the role of TNCs. It is only in the past century that explicit attempts have been made to 
separate public from private, both in theoretical discussions and in practice (Haufler 
2006:86). “Globalization undermines the authority of the state and enhances the demand and 
capacity of firms to produce new forms of private authority in its place” (Cutler et. al. 
1999:339). “Global governance typically refers to Rosenau’s notion of `governance without 
government´ (Rosenau 1992:4), presuming the absence of some overarching governmental 
authority at the international level monitoring and enforcing the activities and interactions 
governed” (Vormedal 2005:13). Private governance thus refers to institutionalized 
cooperation between public and private functions.  
 
Crane and Matten (2007:478) differentiate between traditional context (Westphalia setting) 
on one side, and Globalized context (Post-Westphalia setting) on the other side. States have 
lost power compared to their previous positions. States are now competing more for the 
means to create wealth within their territory than for power over more territory (Stopford and 
Strange 1991). Strange (1992:1) argues that “governments, like academics, must wake up to 
the structural changes in world politics and pay proper attention to the increasing importance 
of firms.”   
 
TNCs are essentially capitalist enterprises. As such they must behave 
according to the basic `rules´ of capitalism, the most fundamental of which is 
the drive for profit. Of course, business firms may well have a variety of 
motives other than profit, such as increasing their share of a market, 
becoming the industry leader, or simply making the firm bigger. But in the 
long run, none of this is more important than the pursuit of profit itself 
(Dicken 2003:199 in Bull and McNeill 2007:164).  
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It is stated in the documentary The Corporation (2003) that nothing is ever enough for a 
corporation when it comes to profit. The Corporation argues that if you cannot make a 
product in a sustainable way, there should not be room for this corporation in a sustainable 
world. The largest TNCs have business interests stretching over large parts of the world and 
gross corporate sales are larger than the GNP of many middle-income countries (Ruud 
2001:65). TNCs are seen as players that operate beyond the reach of individual governments, 
and particularly home country governments. Because of the growing importance of TNCs, 
the character of international political interaction is changing (Ibid.). 
 
Realism has been the most widely accepted approach to international affairs. It goes as far 
back as Thucydides who argued that international politics is best studied by looking at 
interstate relations (Grieco 1988). Waltz (1979) points out that studies ought to focus on the 
interaction between national governments which seek to maximize national interests in 
absolute terms. National states have been seen as the only significant decision-making 
entities.  Due to the rise of transnational organized non-state actors and their growing 
involvement in world politics, the assumption of states as the only important units is 
challenged. The growing focus on non-state actors such as Shell, Exxon, Amnesty 
International and Greenpeace started a trend of scholars questioning the teaching of political 
realism. Keohane and Nye (1977) argued that realism was no longer a comprehensive theory 
and introduced their alternative theory known as liberal pluralism or complex 
interdependence. Based on this, Keohane and Nye predicted that states would attempt to use 
transnational players as instruments to obtain power. Numerous scholarly discussions on this 
theme have led to a growing consensus that these non-state units have resulted in 
fundamental changes in international politics. For example, since the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648, European society has been built on the basis of the Weberian model of state, where the 
state has a monopoly over use of legitimate violence. The increasing number of private 
military companies is an obvious example that challenges the notion of state as the only 
actor with legitimate use of violence. This phenomenon also challenges the theory of states 
as the only important actors in international politics (Ruud 2001:67). Based on the work of 
Susan Strange (1988, 1991, 1996) I will emphasie the belief that TNCs should have a more 
central role in studies of international relations. Strange (1996:44) points out that “the shift 
from states to markets has actually made political players of the TNCs.”   
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States and private actors are increasingly interlinked within a new form of multilateralism, 
which Bull and McNeill (2007:3) call `market multilateralism´.  Multilateralism describes a 
system between states. Market multilateralism also includes organizations and private actors. 
Commercial interests represent enormous invisible power, which in turn leads to a somewhat 
invisible political influence from TNCs (Farouk 2008; Amoore 2006:49). This makes 
political actors of TNCs which should be implemented in bilateral relationship between 
home and host states.  
3.1 Triangular diplomacy  
The growing importance of TNCs can be seen in various academic work.  
Inspired by the work of Kaiser (1971), Perroux (1950) and Sunkel (1973), 
Stopford and Strange (1991) argued for a transformation of the old, rather 
bipolar game of diplomacy, where national boundaries defined the rules, to a 
situation where negotiations and actions are carried out on a more extensive 
basis. Traditional players in embassies and foreign ministries are still in 
business, but, according to Stopford and Strange (1991:21-22), have been 
joined by members of other domestic government ministries and by the 
executives of firms, both local and foreign. All are now involved in both 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations, both formally and informally. TNCs 
and host country bargaining is becoming part of a complex network of a triad 
of relationships, what Stopford and Strange (1991) termed a `triangular 
diplomacy´ (Ruud 2001:77). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: International relations as perceived by Stopford and Strange (Ruud 2001:77) 
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Stopford and Strange (1991:224) focus primarily on the political role that firms increasingly 
have with host governments. They also argue that a new form of diplomacy is emerging in 
which home countries are increasingly door openers for companies. They believe companies 
gain by coming from a country which occupies a strong position in the multilateral system. 
However, the reverse can also be the case, that company participation strengthens the 
position of its home country (Bull and McNeill 2007:167).  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Kaiser’s diagram (in Stopford and Strange 1991:21) 
 
The arrows in Figure 3.2 indicate attempts by one group to influence the others. The arrows 
pointing downward indicate coercion and regulation rather than dialogue. The ones that 
point upward imply some reverse influence of business on government within countries. 
Kaiser’s diagram shows a two-way relationship to indicate that some states have more 
influence than others over the conduct of international organizations and firms.  
  
It is important to note that the negotiations between state and corporation often take place on 
highly asymmetric terms. Sometimes one party enjoys the upper hand (Ruud 2001). “TNCs 
are becoming increasingly institutionalized in external networks. New forms of politically 
relevant embeddedness evolve. New forms of networking are converting transnational 
corporate players into what can be termed `transnational political players´, involved in 
various `diplomatic´ efforts” (Ibid:82). Hveem et al. (2000:26) argue that triangular 
diplomacy needs more democratic and powerful political governments to ensure that TNCs’ 
economic activity is in accordance with national political targets.    
 
In some cases business is politicized. Gilping (2000) states that TNCs and other transnational 
non-state agents may still be treated as foreign policy tools at the potential disposal of home 
 27
country governments. Hveem et al. (2000: 25-26) argue that there is an increase in the form 
of cooperation between governments and TNCs which takes place as triangular diplomacy, 
as described by Stopford and Strange . This type of diplomacy can create agreements 
between the Norwegian Government, host country and TNCs. When Norwegian society is 
based increasingly on value creation from Norwegian business actors abroad it is difficult to 
exercise traditional political control. Triangular diplomacy is more complex and at the same 
time more realistic. Furthermore, Hveem et al. argue that Kofi Annan’s idea about a `global 
compact´, which was introduced in 1999, makes it even more complicated. The idea was to 
create a set of agreements about investments for development purposes between TNCs, 
governments and representatives from civic society in both countries.   
 
Kofi Annan brought with him an understanding of, and an appreciation for, 
the private sector that none of his predecessors had ever displayed. His 
business education constitutes, in and of itself, a radical departure from the 
traditional governmental diplomatic background of every UN secretary-
general before him (Tesner with Kell 2004:2 in Bull and McNeill 2007:8).  
 
Annan believes that market forces are essential for sustainable development.   
3.2 Public-Private Partnership 
“The state is to an increasing extent `de-governmentalized´ as it no longer 
monopolizes the governing of the general well-being of the population in the 
way that it used to (Rose 1999). As such, the idea of the sovereign state 
governing society top-down through comprehensive planning, programmed 
action and detailed regulations is losing its grip, and is being replaced by 
new ideas about a pluricentric governance based on interdependence, 
negotiation and trust… In order to compensate the limits and failures of both 
state regulation and market regulation, new forms of negotiated governance 
through the formation of public-private partnerships, strategic alliances, 
dialogue groups, consultative committees and inter-organizational networks 
have mushroomed (Sørensen and Torfing 2007:3,2).  
 
PPPs are becoming increasingly more central when studying the relationship between public 
and private, and especially when studying TNCs’ influence on government. PPP has been 
surprisingly little mentioned in front of elections and the public therefore knows little about 
it (Hodge and Greve 2005). The UN defines partnerships as “voluntary and collaborative 
relationships between various parties, both state and non-state, in which all participants agree 
to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks 
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and responsibilities, resources and benefits (UN General Assembly 2005:4 in Bull and 
McNeill 2007:6).  
 
The phenomenon of PPPs may be seen as one of the many outcomes of what is referred to as 
`globalization´. Globalization has many different dimensions. The most significant for PPP 
is the changes in the scale and pattern of international capital flows, the increase of flows of 
private capital, and the relative decline in the `official´ flows. The immense development in 
communication and technology has concentrated power and resources in giant TNCs. It is 
parts of globalization and the wakening power and authority of the national state, which have 
made Governments incrisingly depend on the private sector for implementation of public 
goods (Bull and McNeill 2007:45). Hveem et al. (2000:25) point out that TNCs cooperate 
with national governments both domestically and internationally. TNCs engage in 
cooperation to influence politics and make sure that political changes do not have a negative 
impact on them. However, Brinkerhoff (2002:178) argues that the cooperation that is taking 
place is better described as network governance than PPPs because network governance 
better captures the variety of interorganizational relations. 
3.3 Network governance 
Specification of the partnership dimensions of mutuality and organization identity serves to 
better distinguish partnerships as a particular type of network and to identify and support the 
attainment of their value-added contributions. There have been various contributions and 
discussions of the terms governance and network. Sørensen and Torfing (2007:9) define 
governance network as: 
 
1. A relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but 
operationally autonomous actors; 2. Who interact through negotiations; 3. 
Which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary 
framework; 4. That is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies; 
and 5. Which contributes to the production of public purpose. 
 
This makes governance network differ from the hierarchical rule of the state, and it also 
differs from the anarchy of the market.  
 
Public-private policy networks are a less formal and more horizontal form of cooperation 
and governance. The reason for studying governance network is that policy, defined as the 
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attempt to achieve a desired outcome, is the result of a governing process that is no longer 
fully controlled by the government. The policy is subject to negotiations between a wide 
range of public, semi-public and private actors, whose interactions give rise to a relatively 
stable pattern of policy making that constitutes a specific form of regulation and cooperation 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2007:4).  Government officials and TNC representatives are in an 
influx network. People in the private sector often start working in the public and vice versa. 
As a TNC you have to use networks to your advantage to influence relevant actors. The oil 
and gas industry is especially conscious of the importance of networking. Networks can be 
seen as the informal, or invisible, interface between private and public. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Network governance 
 
Policies are made in complex networks of actors …because many participants 
contribute in many different ways, it is difficult even in principle to identify 
who is responsible for political outcomes and thus to establish political 
accountability. In particular, limiting accountability to officials seems myopic 
in modern political systems. Political outcomes are the product of `many 
hands´ (March and Olsen 1995:158 in Sørensen and Torfing 2007:274). 
  
Large TNCs can obviously be responsible for one of the hands March and Olsen refer to and 
is a challenge for representative democracies.  
3.4 Corporate social responsibility  
“The road to hell is paved with good intentions” (Soysa 2008). 
 
Most studies agree that CSR is promoted because it is in the TNC’s own interest, in addition 
to corresponding to the firm’s norms and values. Milton Friedman, the Nobel-Prize winning 
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economist, argues that a corporation cannot have a social responsibility. He says that “the 
social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (Crane and Matten 2007:43). In the 
following I will assert that CSR is used by TNCs in their own interests.  
 
CSR is grounded in the thoughts that a corporation has a triple bottom line: economic, social 
and environmental (Elkington 1998 in Crane and Matten 2007).7 Carroll (1991 in Crane and 
Matten 2007:49) presents a pyramid that shows the responsibilities expected by a 
corporation.  
 
Figure 3.3: (Crane and Matten 2007:49)  
 
Furthermore, I present four main corporate strategies related to CSR (Crane and Matten 
2007:53; Tulder and Zwart 2006:143-146): 
1. Inactive: This strategy reflects the classical notion of Friedman that companies are 
only responsible for generating profit. The corporation denies responsibility for social 
issues, for example by claiming that social issues are the responsibility of 
                                                 
7 Based on these thoughts, Tulder and Zwart (2006:142) presents a Triple-P bottom line consisting three dimensions of 
CSR; profit, people and planet.  
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government. The inactive and defensive strategy focuses on profit maximization and 
productivity.  
2. Defensive: The company admits responsibility but fights. The corporation does the 
very least that is required from it to avoid making mistakes. It is a belief that a 
company that does something wrong will be affected by the reputation mechanism. 
An indication for this approach can be that the company focuses more on public 
relation campaigns than positive action.  
3. Active: This strategy involves accepting responsibility and pursuing ethical values so 
that the company’s activities are in accordance with its stated values. This approach 
is also chosen because it will give the TNC a good reputation and therefore lead to 
economic gains.   
4. Proactive: The corporation seeks to go beyond industry norms and anticipate future 
expectations by doing more than is expected. A proactive approach is characterized 
by undertaking activities aimed at pleasing external stakeholders.   
 
Crane and Matten (2007) argue that business ethics begin where the regulation stops. They 
define government as all legislative and executive bodies that act on the basis of 
parliamentary consent. In addition, they define regulation as “rules that are issued by 
governmental actors and other delegated authorities to constrain, enable, or encourage 
particular business behaviors. Regulation includes rule definitions, laws, mechanisms, 
processes, sanctions and incentives” (Ibid:458). There has been a focus on creating 
guidelines and standards that TNCs should follow. If TNCs create rules and guidelines for 
their work it will put pressure on the rest of the industry. TNCs tend to seek less regulation 
and say, for example, that the market forces will lead to more investments on renewable 
energy because of the high oil prices. However, Beate Sjåfjell (2008) argues for the need for 
regulation and an active government. It is not sufficient that companies secure profit before 
they start to think about acting in a sustainable way.  There are some signs of stricter 
regulation for TNCs, but it cannot yet be described as a trend. There are few laws concerning 
CSR in Norway. One exception is the prohibition to contribute to corruption, which was 
implemented in 2003. In addition, the stock exchange law requires that companies publish 
reports on the environmental consequences of their activities and the actions that are taken to 
limit those consequences (PCC 2008:69).          
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Market power does not automatically give political power, but can, under certain 
circumstances, transfer into political power (Hveem et al. 2000). Norwegian society has been 
characterized by cooperation between different actors involved, such as the Government, 
public institutions, labor unions and private actors. Hveem et al. question if this model has 
been weakened. According to Strange’s (1996) thoughts about corporations taking the 
leading role and the weakening of the state, Linda Weiss (1998) presents the theory of state 
as just a service agent for firms. Firms have been built up, by the help of government, and 
are now too big for governments to control. Some go as far as saying that “corporations rule 
the world” (Korten 1995 in Fuchs 2007:43). Although there has been international variation, 
the 1990s was distinguished by large-scale privatization, de-regulation and liberalization 
(Tulder and Zwart 2006). The theory of the receding state is illustrated in figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4: (Tulder and Zwart 2006:74) 
 
TNCs can be seen as increasing their role because of CSR. All this theory on the role of 
TNCs in different settings in international politics creates the basis for how one can imagine 
the power of TNCs will influence home country government. 
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3.5 A framework for analyzing TNCs’ power  
Fuchs’ (2007:4) work shows “that business clearly has become a pivotal political actor”. All 
parts of society influence politics and it is therefore natural that private business influences 
politics.  
Claims about a lack of significant influence of business on politics advanced 
by a small but persistent group of scholars and practitioners need to be met 
with scepticism. At the same time, however, undifferentiated claims of 
corporations ruling the world, advanced by a continuously growing group of 
writers, fail to capture the complexities of current developments in the role of 
business in global governance (Fuchs 2007:4).  
 
Fuchs’ (2007) uses three dimensions of power to study TNCs relation to home government: 
instrumental, structural and discursive power. This classification makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate between the different dimensions. Fuchs says that the dimensions are 
overlapping and that some topics will have an effect through more than one dimension. 
Structural and discursive powers are the most overlapping dimensions. Fuchs (2007:165-
166) points out that “the three dimensions of power can be mutually reinforcing, they also 
can be mutually constraining”.  In general, Fuchs’ work concludes that business has indeed 
gained political power and increased its capability to influence political outcomes (Ibid:169). 
I argue that Fuchs analyses, to some extent, straddle different levels. I am of the opinion that 
discursive power is not on the same level as instrumental and structural power and will have 
an effect on the other power dimensions rather than being a separate dimension.  
 
Further, it is important to clarify my use of the concepts of power and influence. Vormedal 
(2008:44) argues that while power and influence are intimately linked concepts, it is possible 
to distinguish between them. For example, influence can be defined as a relationship 
resulting in a modification of one actor’s behavior by that of another, whereas power refers 
to capability, that is, the spectrum of power resources and power activities available to 
actors. I choose to study TNCs’ power based on the assumption that power can form the 
basis of influence. Contrary to Fuchs, I categorize TNCs’ power according to two 
dimensions, or sources, of power influence: power resources and power activities. TNCs’ 
discursive power will be dealt with in each of the dimensions. To operationalize power I 
have chosen the two mentioned dimensions. If the empirical findings correspond to the 
theory, the hypothesis will be strengthened. My operationalization of power is described 
below.    
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3.5.1 Power resources   
A structuralist approach to global governance suggest that the owners of capital exercise 
power over state managers, in that they are able to shape the context in which states make 
decisions (Newell and Levy 2006:172). In general, the impression is that business has 
expanded its power by becoming an active rule and agenda setter (Ibid:170). TNCs can 
determine issues, define problems, control research, and design, adopt, implement and 
enforce `solutions´ themselves (Fuchs 2007:104). Fuchs (2007:132) stresses three reasons 
why the increase in rule-setting activities by business actors matters from a power-theory 
perspective. First, the exercise of power by TNCs by designing and implementing these 
norms, standards and rules affects the rest of society. Second, the rule-setting activities 
influence employees and consumers and therefore society. Third, rule-setting may prevent or 
undermine more stringent and effective rule-setting by government and public actors.  
 
TNCs actively use their superior knowledge and resource position. This is due to 
governments’ structural dependence on economic growth, employment and investment 
(Fuchs 2007:105). “The growing role of knowledge-intensive production and innovation-
based competition has furthered the importance of knowledge relative to capital as a basis of 
structural power, which in turn is largely `owned´ by corporations” (Mytelka 2000 in Fuchs 
2007:107). Governments’ dependency on TNCs’ technology and experience is a power 
resource for companies. Technological power also strengthens TNCs’ discursive power.  
 
Discursive power deals with TNCs’ ability to influence policies and the political process 
through the shaping of ideas and norms in society. Discursive power relies on persuasion, the 
perception of legitimacy, and voluntary compliance (Fuchs 2007:64). Fuchs argues that 
business holds an advantaged position in the competition for discursive power due to its 
preponderance of resources (Fuchs 2007:154). Discursive power is important because of its 
ability to be preceding interest formation and because it is a diffuse, pervasive, and socially 
comprehensive power. Discursive power is the least researched dimension of business power 
in global governance. In addition to the superior knowledge held by TNCs, the biggest TNCs 
have access to more resources than many small countries. This includes both economic and 
human superiority and builds on the argument by Stein Rokkan (1987) that votes count, but 
resources decide.  
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Power resources also involve the privatization and the expansion of business to the extent 
that business is taking over tasks previously provided by governments. Business is being 
trusted to carry out tasks previously considered to be the domain of the government (Fuchs 
2007:64).  
3.5.2 Power activities  
Activities directed towards decision makers can give TNCs power to influence. Power 
activities can be defined as activities which render probable influence on the political 
system. This can, for example, be exercised through lobbying, networking, campaigns and 
party financing (Fuchs 2007:8). Fuchs (2007:78) states that there has been an increase in 
political mobilization from TNCs. She says that the “increasing willingness of business to be 
involved in politics has been paralleled by improvements in access granted by politicians and 
bureaucrats, whose dependence on resources and inputs from interest groups in general and 
business actors in particular has risen” (Ibid.). For example, “business is frequently the 
predominant voice on advisory committees and delegations today” (Ibid:79).  Business 
representation in political delegations is becoming the norm and has turned into an arena of 
significant potential for TNCs to execute power.   
 
Lobbying is a central channel where TNCs have power. By using national, transnational and 
supranational activities TNCs can increase their power over policies, politicians and 
bureaucrats. Lobbying is a way of informing and at the same time persuading government 
representatives (Crane and Matten 2007:466-468). The traditional scholarly definition of 
lobbying is given by Lester Milbrath (in Fuchs 2007:71): “Lobbying is the stimulation and 
transmission of a communication, by someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, 
directed at a governmental decision maker with the hope of influencing his decisions”. TNCs 
usually have a large budget for lobbying because it is perceived as important. Politicians also 
use the lobbyists actively to get hold of information in an easy way. Lobbyists can use their 
expertise to warn politicians of effects of different types of political decisions. In most 
countries in which a regulatory framework for lobbying exists, direct attempts to exchange 
money for political favours would be illegal (Fuchs 2007:72). There is limited research on 
lobbying in Norway.8 Interest group politics in the United States are much more visible, 
documented and researched than in other countries, but one cannot necessarily generalize 
from the US case (Ibid.). Inputs to political documents are also a form of power activities. It 
                                                 
8 For an overview see Gulbrandsen (2008).  
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is a way for decision makers to hear all affected parties’ views and at the same time TNCs 
can argue for their cause. In addition to these activities directed towards the political system, 
TNCs have practices which give some sort of discursive power.  
 
Himmelstein (1997 in Fuchs 2007:146) argues that corporations struggle between `looking 
good´ and `doing good´.  To look good, business communicates its societal achievements as 
a corporate citizen. This contributes to the popular perception of a certain identity of 
business actors. This communication adds legitimacy to TNCs’ self-regulation and is 
therefore also increasing legitimacy of TNCs as political actors (Fuchs 2007:8;148).  
  
While discursive power can thus be a particularly strong source of influence, 
it simultaneously is the most fragile dimension of an actor’s power as well as 
the most dangerous one if undermined. A decline or disappearance of a 
business’s political legitimacy would not only lead to a dramatic reduction in 
its discursive power but cause challenges to its rule-setting and instrumental 
power as well… The precariousness of the situation becomes clear when one 
considers how vulnerable the discursive power of business actually is (Fuchs 
2007:148).       
 
In addition to these challenges, the change in dominant societal norms and ideas affects the 
social context where the discursive power is embedded (Ibid.). TNCs are expected to be 
using political communication to shape policy and actor-specific, as well as broader societal 
norms and ideas. The ability to buy media space and time have led TNCs to spend huge 
sums of money on commercial campaigns, with the objective of convincing the public that 
they are good citizens (Ibid:150-151). The discursive power of a company builds on its 
structural power position and increases the company’s power through persuading and 
convincing the relevant actors. 
 
PPP is an example of an avenue where business can exercise power that increasingly 
involves active rule-setting power (Fuchs 2007:104-105). Fuchs (2007:113) argues that 
“under less promising conditions, public-private partnerships are unlikely to provide much 
progress toward the effective pursuit of public objectives and in the worst case would allow 
the utilization of public resources in the pursuit of private interests”. In PPPs, business actors 
can participate in the implementation process of the home government’s policy. “If business 
loses its legitimacy as a political actor in the eyes of the public, self-regulation, for instance, 
will become very difficult to justify” (Ibid:148). Aware of this vulnerability, business 
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actively engages in efforts to secure and increase its political legitimacy (Ibid:167). TNCs 
are expected to be enhancing the perceived legitimacy of PPPs and self-regulation. TNCs 
promote CSR and use the CSR label to gain legitimacy in society. However, critics argue 
that CSR is characterized by vagueness and heterogeneity and therefore provides little 
evidence of a systematically improved environmental and social conduct of companies. The 
vagueness and heterogeneity make assessments of performance difficult, which diffuses 
possibilities for evaluation and criticism. Through participation in self-regulation and PPPs, 
business has power over the policy process by deciding the focus area, the actual design and 
implementation (Fuchs 2007:64). 
 
These two sources of power indicate clear empirical expectation about what will indicate 
that StatoilHydro has power and uses this power. To analyze StatoilHydro’s power through 
























“This industry deals with natural resources and has a very long-term perspective. The 
industry has considerable spin-off effects on society. This makes it very close to the interface 
between politics and economics” (Source in StatoilHydro (7)).   
 
The privileged role of Statoil had been a cornerstone of Norwegian oil and gas policy since 
the company was established in 1972 (Claes 2003:54). Claes (2003) points out the special 
characteristics of oil as a strategic commodity. Therefore, National Oil Companies (NOCs) 
have had a strategic role for their home country. The oil industry has gone through phases of 
structural changes. In the 1950s and 1960s the `seven sisters´ controlled more than 90 
percent of the world’s oil reserves and production. In this period the role of state owned 
companies was minimal. During the 1970s, all that changed, and NOCs grew stronger. Many 
oil-exporting nations have established state owned companies in order to better control 
extraction, production, and export of oil and gas reserves. By doing this, states have reduced 
the dependency on International Oil Companies (IOCs). No industry can be compared with 
the size and power of the oil industry. This sector contributes to large parts of Norway’s 
income, a value creation which creates the basis for the power of the Norwegian oil industry 
in general, and StatoilHydro specifically (25). Two-thirds of the Oslo stock exchange is 
involved in the oil and gas industry (Foss 2008).  
 
In 1984 the Norwegian oil sector was reorganized and the role of Statoil was reduced. In 
2001 Statoil was partly privatized, but the Norwegian oil sector still had to be seen as highly 
state-regulated. Statoil wanted a part-privatization to be able to engage in long-term alliances 
with IOCs. “A premise for privatizing Statoil in 2001 was that the company should have a 
national foundation with headquarters, research and strategic decisions taken in Norway. 
Beyond this the privatized Statoil should have commercial independence” (PCC 2008:60). 
For a long time, the industry was built up by Statoil, Hydro and Saga Petroleum. Statoil 
joined Hydro in taking over Saga and the mix of state owned, semi-state owned and private 
was abolished.  As late as 1998, the Minister of Oil and Energy expressed the Government’s 
wish to have three Norwegian oil companies. Because of the part-privatization in 2001, a 
new state owned oil company, Petoro, was set up to manage the state’s interests in the 
Norwegian oil and gas fields. Petoro is a holding company and Statoil continues to operate 
the sales of Petoro’s physical oil and gas reserves (31). The idea behind dividing Statoil and 
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Petoro, was to give Statoil a role as an IOC and avoid it having a political role (Olsen 2008). 
The State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) was created because Statoil’s political role was 
too dominant (Storeng 2008). The state participates as a direct investor in oil and gas 
activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) through SDFI. The state owned limited 
company Petoro AS manages the SDFI (MPE 2008c). 
 
Historically, the Government gave the most attractive oil fields to Norwegian companies. 
These privileges should have made sure that the two companies realized political goals 
which were in the best interests of Norwegian society (Ryggvik and Engen 2005:20). ¨The 
merger of Statoil and Hydro is an example of a trend in NOCs, that they are growing bigger 
and more powerful” (Sjøgren 2008). The campaign for partly privatizing Statoil and the 
merger of Statoil and Hydro were both done with the objective of internationalizing 
StatoilHydro (Storeng 2008). Internationalizing StatoilHydro has been a target for the last 
ten years. “We are, as a matter of fact, living in the real world. Of course it is in Norway’s 
interest that StatoilHydro is an international company… We are playing on the same team” 
(Norwegian ambassador (28)). However, most informants argue that the “interests on the 
NCS would have been better taken care of with Hydro and Statoil separated” (source in OLF 
(25)).  
 
Statoil would probably have disappeared without the deprivatization and internationalization. 
The oil and gas reserves on the NCS are not enough for StatoilHydro. “The big elephants in 
Norway are found” (Sjøgren 2008). The oil cluster in Norway is dependent on 
internationalization (31). The objective of internationalizing the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry has been that StatoilHydro should take the leading role and make way for the 
supplier industry. However, the suppliers that have internationalized have had little help 
from StatoilHydro (25). It is argued that StatoilHydro is too little engaged in bringing the 
Norwegian supplier industry with them (34). This is part of a trend where there is a swing 
from the oil companies being the most powerful and with the most competence to a situation 
where the supplier industry has more competence and knowledge power (Hansen 2008). An 
important internationalization event happened in 1997 when INTSOK was established. 
INTSOK was created by the MPE, the MFA and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), 
and the participants from industry were Statoil, Hydro, the Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise (NHO), Rederiforbundet and the Norwegian oil industry association (OLF). Rolf 
Magne Larsen, former director of Statoil’s international division says that Statoil was the 
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major promoter of the work with INTSOK (in Salvesen 1998). INTSOK seeks to promote 
international expansion by creating arenas, dialogue, and giving market and project 
information.9  
 
Norway holds a competitive advantage in the petroleum industry, which accounts for one-
third of total Norwegian outward FDI. FDI in the petroleum sector has risen from NOK 
87,408 million in 1998 to NOK 216,755 million in 2005, an annual growth rate of 13.9% 
(Hveem et. al. 2008:4). More than 50% of StatoilHydro's investment in 2006 was in the 
international arena (PCC 2008:98). In 2008, some 20% of StatoilHydro’s income is from the 
international arena. The suppliers and contractors already derive more than half of their 
income from outside Norway (Lunde et. al. 2008:115). Internationalization has an obvious 
positive effect for the different companies. However, if Norway wants to develop an 
international oil industry, we need to be prepared to get dirt on our hands (Gjelsvik 2008). 
 
With the uncertainty in the energy market, the petroleum companies increasingly get a 
political mandate. In addition to making money, the oil companies must secure oil and gas 
supply for their home country. Additionally, it is an advantage for an oil company to come 
from a politically and militarily strong country so that the host country can benefit from the 
power of the home country. This is an advantage for companies from the USA, Great Britain 
and France. Norway’s comparative advantage is that it is seen as a socially democratic 
country, a peace enforcer and a supporter of developing countries through the UN. 
Politicians in developing countries will therefore benefit from being associated with 
Norwegian politicians (Ryggvik and Engen 2005:12-14). Before analyzing how 
StatoilHydro’s power can influence the governmental decision to promote StatoilHydro as a 
Norwegian agent in realizing energy and climate initiatives in Brazil, the next chapter will 
give an account of Norway’s and StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil.  
 
 
                                                 
9 INTSOK will be accounted for in 5.5.2.  
 41
5. Norway and StatoilHydro in Brazil 
“Norwegian policy is to promote Norwegian business interests, it is to exploit oil. 
Norwegian policy is also to work on climate… We believe that we can do both at the same 
time. However, it is a pedagogical challenge to communicate that” (source in MFA (26)).   
 
 
Figure 5.1: World map 
 
 
       Figure 5.2: Brazilian map 
 
This chapter explains Norwegian cooperation with Brazil in general and specifically 
StatoilHydro’s initiatives in Brazil. It demonstrates how StatoilHydro is politically and 
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financially supported by the Norwegian Government and how StatoilHydro is promoted in 
Brazil as an agent of Norway’s energy and climate policies. 
5.1 History 
Brazil’s history is characterized by unstable political and economical conditions. This has 
changed, however, and today Brazil is seen as a stable democracy with a growing economy 
that has a good long-term outlook. Brazil still has its problems, especially regarding social 
inequality, but it is developing in the right direction. The country’s Gini coeffient, which 
measures social inequality, is going down for the first time, which indicates that the 
differences between rich and poor are becoming smaller (Ferraz 2008).  
 
Norwegian companies have been present in Brazil for many years. Norway has an embassy 
in Brasilia and a consulate in Rio de Janeiro. The governments of the two countries are both 
in the socialist party family. The formal bilateral cooperation between the countries has 
increased rapidly from 2003, when King Harald made an official visit to Brazil. This visiting 
party included a large delegation of business representatives. Since King Harald’s visit, there 
have been several political delegations to Brazil. The latest one was led by Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg, who represented Norway at the Rio Oil and Gas exhibition, the largest 
industry event in Latin America, and made a pledge to contribute to the Brazilian rain forest 
fund. During the same delegation the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU). It states that the two countries will cooperate on issues including deforestation, 
application and transfer of clean technology and on sustainable development (MOU 2008). 
StatoilHydro would like the Government to sign MOUs to secure Norway’s cooperation with 
Brazil (14). Furthermore, Brazil has also sent delegations to Norway, including President 
Lula, Petrobras, members of its oil administration and others. Norway has also financed a 
visit to the Norwegian petroleum directorate for the Brazilian Government and Brazilian 
organizations (Hippe 2006). At the same time, the labor unions in Statoil (SAFE/YS) 
financed a visit for Brazilian oil workers. Norway can teach the importance of dialogue 
between different actors and there has been an initiative through the MFA and the NHO to 
start a Norwegian-Brazilian forum for social dialogue (Araldsen et. al. 2006).  
 
Together with Sweden, Brazil is one of the nations leading the work on CSR by creating new 
standards and guidelines for through the international standard organization (ISO) (Hippe 
2006). The ISO has created ISO 14000, for the environment, and ISO 26000 for CSR. These 
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standards are developed by TNCs, NGOs, CSOs and governments (Crane and Matten 
2007:493). The StatoilHydro community project `Na Trilha do Peregrino´ helps raise skill 
levels in communities near Peregrino, while the School of Waters in the Low South Bahia 
area will help teenagers with oyster farming and fishing, horticulture, IT education, business 
knowledge and capoeira (15). This project could have some positive long-term effects for 
StatoilHydro because the education level near Peregrino will increase. However, this 
education program is not directed towards StatoilHydro’s need for competence and is 
therefore better understood as philanthropic initiatives. The CSR profile promoted by 
StatoilHydro’s base organization is directed more towards demonstrating that the company 
has a special responsibility and that they take responsibility by, for example, being more 
environmentally friendly than other companies. In this case, StatoilHydro’s CSR strategy is 
both philanthropic and reputation-related on the project level and mostly reputation-related 
at the centralized level. CSR is undoubtedly a focus area for StatoilHydro and their CSR 
strategy is much discussed and disputed. I argue that StatoilHydro’s CSR approach can be 
described as in the interface between defensive and active CSR strategy, maybe leaning 
more towards an active CSR strategy according to the classification in 3.4. It can also be 
argued that StatoilHydro has a proactive approach to CSR because it is seen as a leading 
actor in CSR. However, StatoilHydro has on several occasions acted contrary to the desires 
of Norwegian Government, which is an important external stakeholder. This can be 
illustrated, for example, by StatoilHydro’s attitude towards involvement in environmentally 
disputed projects.   
 
Brazil is Norway’s most important trade partner in Latin-America. From 2000 to 2007 there 
has been a doubling of imports and exports between the countries. The increase in 
Norwegian exports is mostly due to the oil sector, although most supermarkets also sell 
Norwegian bacalao (dried, salted cod). Norwegian business investments in Brazil from 2000 
to 2006 are estimated at around NOK 15 billion. The main investors are Norsk Hydro in 
Alunorte, StatoilHydro, Norse Energy, DNV, Norske Skog, Jotun and Mustad (Araldsen et. 
al. 2006).  
 
The Brazilian oil findings in the last few years have given rise to a new positive attitude to 
nationalization such as the “O petróleo é nosso” – “the oil is ours” era when Petrobras was 
established (Giæver 2008). Brazil has decided to invest time and thought into how they are 
going to administrate its oil resources. The Brazilian Government is considering using a 
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Norwegian-based model with a company similar to Petoro in addition to the main Brazilian 
energy company Petrobras (35). Petrobras is 40% owned by the Brazilian Government and is 
on the stock exchange in the USA. It is substantially more affected by political governance 
than StatoilHydro and President Lula has the power to instruct Petrobras. Following election, 
the new President chooses the CEO of Petrobras. Lula’s influence on the governance of 
Petrobras could make the company prioritize Brazilian interests over commercial interests 
(14). In September 2008, Jens Stoltenberg explained the organization of the Norwegian oil 
industry to Brazilians. The Brazilian Minister of Oil and Energy, Edison Lobao, believes 
Norway has a lot to offer the Brazilian oil industry (29). President Lula also welcomes the 
Norwegian model, particularly as regards the creation of a state owned company like Petoro 
(1).  
5.2 The Brazilian `moon landing´ 
Brazil has long been known to be of great importance when it comes to studying energy and 
climate. In 1990, Rivedal and Tranøy (1990:1) stated: 
 
Brazil is of particular interest when discussing CO2 emissions and climate 
change. The country has huge potential for much greater energy 
consumption: it has natural resources for far larger industrial production 
than that carried out today, it has technological skills for economic expansion 
and the country has a large population, which constitutes a sizeable domestic 
market.   
 
The extent of Brazilian energy production has been similar to that of Norway. However, 
Brazil will have substantially higher production in the future, while Norwegian production 
will decrease. In 1997, the Brazilian oil and gas market was opened up to international 
actors. StatoilHydro writes that Brazil “has demonstrated that it has large resource potential 
and an attractive and stable investment environment” (StatoilHydro 2008). Brazil has found 
large numbers of new oil and gas fields in recent years, which Stoltenberg refers to as 
“Brazil’s moon landing”. It is estimated that Brazil probably has ten times more oil resources 
than remain on the NCS. Last year’s finding of oil makes Brazil one of the biggest and most 
important oil provinces in the world. The CEO of StatoilHydro, Helge Lund, has said that 
Brazil now looks the same as the North Sea did 20-30 years ago, which makes him believe 
there are great opportunities in Brazil (journalist (29)). The gigantic findings are localized in 
places with more than 2,000 meters’ water depth, which makes accessibility difficult. This is 
a competitive advantage for the Norwegian oil industry because they have extensive 
 45
experience of working with difficult offshore projects on the NCS (Giæver 2008). In 
addition to the challenging water depths, the Presalt oil fields are 2,000 meters below a 
burning hot, unstable layer of salt, demanding high competence levels to deal with the 
conditions. The cost of producing the oil is estimated to be around USD 40-50 per barrel 
(Ibid.). Brazil has the potential to become the most important market for the Norwegian 
offshore industry. Stoltenberg says that Norwegian companies have already agreed contracts 
equal to NOK 60 billion (in Halvorsen 2008). Petrobras has found nine large oil fields in the 
last couple of years. Most of them are situated in the Santos-basin, 250 km off the coast of 
Rio de Janeiro. The most famous are Tupi, Jupiter, Bem-te-vi and Carioca, which together 
contains some 50-80 billion barrels of oil (1). Tupi is the largest and is estimated to hold 
some 8 billion barrels of oil, equivalent to twice as much as the Ekofisk field in the North 
Sea (1). In addition to Norwegian oil interests in Brazil, Norway has made considerable 
investments in deforestation.  
 
StatoilHydro (7) explains that licenses for oil and gas exploration in Brazil are given to the 
company that makes the highest bid. The process is broadcast on national television and the 
envelope with the highest bid gets the license. In Norway the licensing process involves an 
evaluation of the entire application to ensure a longer term perspective on resource 
exploitation. The Brazilian process is more commercial to avoid corruption. Therefore, the 
home country of the company does not affect the process to any extent (7). Although 
relations and networks do not lead to concessions in Brazil, they are still important. INTSOK 
emphasises the important role of the Norwegian Government as a door opener (14). 
Petrobras is by far the largest Brazilian oil company and operates 80% of the oil and gas 
activities in Brazil. It is therefore the main target for Norwegian companies with an interest 
in Brazil (14). StatoilHydro hopes that Petrobras will bring StatoilHydro with them when 
they are bidding (14). The most challenging parts of the Brazilian system are the regional tax 
system and the demand for local content. Brazil demands that oil companies use 40% of 
investments to buy goods and services from Brazilian companies (WIR 2007:168). It is also 





“Norwegian – Brazilian cooperation has a positive spill-over effect on Norwegian business” 
(source in MFA (26)).  
 
The Norwegian rain forest initiative has promised USD 1 billion through 2015, depending on 
the success of the project. The agreement was signed by Stoltenberg and Lula da Silva on  
16 September 2008 (OPM  2008). This is said to be the most effective Norwegain CO2 
reduction project because it has negative CO2 emissions. The Norwegian initiative in Brazil 
could reduce CO2 emissions by as much as half of Norway’s annual emissions level 
(Farsunds Avis 2008). It is said that 20% of the total CO2 emissions in the world are due to 
deforestation of rain forest (URL 2) and one-third of all the rain forest in the world is found 
in Brazil. The Brazilian forest director, Tasso Rezende de Azevedo (2008), visited Oslo on 
30 May 2008 and presented the rain forest fund to the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (Norad). He pointed out that an extensive surveillance system has been 
developed which makes it possible for contributors to have full control. Tasso also pointed 
out that the money will follow the principle of “performance-based pay”.  
 
The rain forest initiative shows that Norway values Brazil and can be seen as an extremely 
beneficial project for other Norwegian businesses in Brazil. The MFA (26) says that 
Norwegian business interests are not involved in the decision to focus on the rain forest in 
Brazil. There are no indications that StatoilHydro has lobbied for this project on 
deforestation. However, MFA believes the rain forest initiative has an unintended positive 
side effect for Norwegian business interests. Ryggvik (2008) points out that the initiative 
will indirectly secure more oil production for StatoilHydro in Brazil. He argues that the 
initiative should never have been initiated because of issues arising from conflicting roles. 
Furthermore, Ryggvik has problems accepting that a climate initiative indirectly leads to 
more oil exploitation opportunities for StatoilHydro. He suggests that the rain forest funding 
could, for example, have gone to Ecuador, where there is less Norwegian business interest 
and the rain forest is on top of an oil field. This situation can be compared to the situation 
with oil exploitation in the North of Norway, such as Lofoten, where it is difficult for oil 
companies to get access to the oil. The Equador example would have been a rain forest 
initiative with a double climate effect, because it would reduce deforestation and also the 
production of oil.    
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It has been said that rain forest initiatives are an easy option because one does not need 
technology to stop cutting down the forest. This is an analogy that can also be used in the oil 
industry. There is no need for technology to stop exploiting oil (Gjærum 2008). The 
comparison is weakened because of the very different characteristics of the two resources.  
5.4 StatoilHydro in Brazil -“O petróleo é nosso” 
With the estimated production, StatoilHydro will probably be the largest international oil 
company in Brazil by 2012, with Petrobras being the only company producing more than 
StatoilHydro (source in StatoilHydro (35)). StatoilHydro works closely with Petrobras, 
which also has its main office in Rio (1). At an INTSOK event in Stavanger, Petrobras and 
StatoilHydro delivered a joint presentation about the benefits of working closely together. As 
already mentioned, StatoilHydro has a close relationship with Petrobras underlined by recent 
agreements on technology sharing, commonality of NOC values, and international growth 
ambitions. StatoilHydro’s environmental credentials and heritage as a Norwegian NOC help 
position the company as an attractive partner for the Brazilian Government. StatoilHydro 
Brazil is a Brazilian company, a legal entity of StatoilHydro ASA (14). The Managing 
Director of StatoilHydro Brazil, Jorge Camargo, is a former employee of Petrobras and has 
also worked for StatoilHydro in Stavanger.  
 
StatoilHydro currently own a 50% stake in the Peregrino field off the coast of Rio de Janeiro 
and holds seven exploration licenses. In the 8th Bid Round in 2006, StatoilHydro was 
awarded three additional exploration blocks. The contracts on these blocks are still to be 
signed (StatoilHydro 2008). StatoilHydro’s 50% stake in the Peregrino field is as an operator 
in the project development phase. The other stakeholder, Anadarko, is an operator in the 
project execution and production phases. However, there will probably be changes. 
“StatoilHydro and Anadarko signed an agreement on 3 March 2008 whereby StatoilHydro 
will take over the remaining 50% of the Brazilian Peregrino project. The transaction is 
pending governmental approval” (Ibid.). StatoilHydro will probably be a 100% operator of 
Peregrino. The first phase of the development of Peregrino includes two drilling and 
wellhead platforms and a ship-shaped floating production, storage and off-take unit (FPSO) 
to minimize environmental impact. StatoilHydro (2008) estimates that recoverable resources 
are in the range of 300-600 million barrels of oil. The first oil is expected in December 2010, 
and production should reach its plateau of 100,000 bbl/day within the first year. It is 
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expected that Peregrino will produce oil for 40 years (source in StatoilHydro (35)). 
However, Peregrino is a small field compared to the new discoveries that have been made in 
the last few years. The most important thing for StatoilHydro is to get into these new fields 
(14). The Peregrino field should demonstrate StatoilHydro’s heavy oil and reservoir 
management skills, which have doubled initial estimates of recoverable reserves. 
StatoilHydro’s subsea and deepwater capabilities, its expertise in complex gas chain 
technology, its NOC heritage, and a strong environmental record combine to position the 
company competitively in helping access Brazil’s abundant hydrocarbons reserves. 
Facts about StatoilHydro’s licenses in Brazil  
StatoilHydro holds acreage in promising areas such as the mature Campos Basin and the 
frontier Santos and Camamu-Almada Basins. Most licenses are located in deepwater areas, 
reaching water depths of up to 2,700 meters. There are five areas where StatoilHydro is 
involved (StatoilHydro 2008): 
1. The acreage in the Santos Basin lies in about 450 to 2,000 meters of water. In the 8th Bid 
Round in 2006, Hydro was awarded three blocks in the Santos Basin, bidding together with 
Petrobras and Repsol. StatoilHydro is the operator of block S-M 1233 with a 40% interest. 
StatoilHydro holds 30% in the other two licenses. 
2. The Jequitinhonha Basin is at the southern end of Brazil’s continental shelf. It is located 
in 1,000 - 2,500 meters of water. A 40% holding in license BM-J-3 was awarded to 
StatoilHydro in the fourth licensing round of 2002. Petrobras is operator for the block, with a 
60% interest, and the partners are committed to drilling two exploration wells. 
3. The fields in the Espirito Santo Basin lie in approximately 2,500 meters of water. 
StatoilHydro was awarded 40% of deepwater block BM-ES-594 in the 7th licensing round of 
October 2005. Petrobras is the operator with 60%. 
4. Campos Basin is one of the few shallow water interests of StatoilHydro in Brazil. It is in 
sea depths of around 100 meters. StatoilHydro was awarded a 50% interest in deepwater 
block C-M-539, located in about 2,500 meters of water in the Campos Basin.   
5. In the Camamu Basin water depths vary from 1,700 to 2,700 meters. Acreage BM-CAL-7 
is divided between StatoilHydro and Petrobras with 40% and 60% stakes respectively. In 
BM-CAL-10 the stakes are the opposite. The partners are required to shoot seismic and drill 
an exploration well in both acreages. StatoilHydro has 100% in BM-CAL-8.  
 
These are all oil fields and it will therefore not be possible to use the CCS technology that 
the industry wants to promote internationally. However, CCS can be of importance for 
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Brazil, independent of StatoilHydro’s activities there (30). Brazil is not against the use of 
CCS (23). It is, however, the largest opponent of making CCS part of the CDM. Brazil and 
other countries in opposition argue that “CCS technologies are being pushed too fast in view 
of the many uncertainties, their limited geographical application and the risk that an increase 
in CCS project activities would divert investments from renewables” (Vormedal 2008:53).  
 
StatoilHydro also has a renewable energy division, but there is reason to question the 
substance of it given its very small size compared to StatoilHydro as a whole. StatoilHydro 
needs a new initiative to counterbalance its heavy oil production in Brazil, in order to 
improve its climate profile. It sees bioethanol as a possible solution (27).  Ethanol is one of 
the few products that can be used instead of oil. Cooperation with the Norwegian owned 
bioethanol producer UMOE BioEnergy may therefore be one way of adding more substance 
to StatoilHydro’s focus on renewable energy. StatoilHydro (2007) is also interested in 
collaborating with Petrobras regarding bioethanol. However, the oil industry is very 
profitable and renewable energy projects are not very attractive because their profitability is 
much lower than that of oil. Profitable renewable energy projects may therefore be dismissed 
because the gains are too low compared to the rest of the companies’  projects (Ryggvik 
2008b).   
5.5 Governmental support  
StatoilHydro receives substantial political and financial support from the Norwegian 
Government. Naturally, StatoilHydro has a close relationship with the Norwegian embassy 
(38). The promotion of Norwegian business interests is positive, but it can be contradictory 
to other Norwegian political targets. It seems that business interests are as important to the 
embassies as other policy areas and an implication from promoting StatoilHydro could be 
that Brazil sees the company’s activities as a reflection of Norwegian activities in general. 
The embassy’s role creates a lack of separation between public and private because it is the 
duty of every ambassador to promote relevant Norwegian business interests (34). Moreover, 
StatoilHydro has historically had some influence on Norwegian embassies and possibly also 
on the appointment of ambassadors that were seen as the most suitable in promoting 
StatoilHydro (source in INTSOK (14)). However, there are no signs of that being the case in 
Brazil. In addition to the Norwegian embassy, the Norwegian political delegations and 
INTSOK are the most important actors for StatoilHydro in Brazil. All of these actors 
promote StatoilHydro’s climate profile.  
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5.5.1 Business representation on political delegations 
If the Government is involved in investment in one country it can lead to several political 
delegations. It has been typical for Norway to involve relevant business actors in political 
delegations. This creates a situation where the Government has dual role. On one side they 
are the non-profit aid donor and on the other side they are promoting profit-seeking industry. 
It is a pedagogic challenge to explain how Norway operates in Brazil. Norway has a totally 
different system than Brazil, especially concerning StatoilHydro and Petrobras (26).  
Representatives from the Government and representatives from StatoilHydro are perceived 
as being one and the same (30). These delegations are extremely important for companies, 
especially StatoilHydro. It is important for StatoilHydro to create a network of people that 
they know and can do business with in the long run. “It is totally vital to have a network with 
access to the right people and decision makers. A face-to-face relationship is especially 
important in Latin-America” (source in MFA (26)).  
   
 
Participation by StatoilHydro in many delegations shows that the company has convinced 
the political community that it is in Norway’s interest that StatoilHydro is represented. 
StatoilHydro can contact the office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to convince the Prime 
Minister to accompany them to relevant events, such as Rio Oil and Gas. Representatives 
from StatoilHydro point out that if a minister goes to Brazil he would expect to meet with his 
Brazilian ministerial counterpart. Furthermore, when the King of Norway was in Brazil he 
met with the Brazilian President. Therefore, if the CEO of StatoilHydro is invited to 
participate in such a delegation, he will expect to meet with the CEO of Petrobras. This is an 
important door opener because they then meet their business partners with representatives 
from the highest level and they also come into contact with government representatives in 
Brazil. The industry actors use these delegations to gain market access by meeting customers 
and clients. StatoilHydro was represented by Helge Lund on the delegation that went to 
Brazil in September 2008. The Norwegian delegation had meetings with the CEO of 
Petrobras, Sergio Gabrielli, the Minister of Oil and Energy Edison Lobao, and Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg met President Lula in Brasilia (1). Being represented and associated 




If there is an event, StatoilHydro can go to the Government and say that other 
oil companies are coming with their ministers and political support. The 
success of StatoilHydro will depend on the governmental support at this 
event. If a minister accompanies us, he will get to meet with the relevant 
decision makers. It is not certain that StatoilHydro can make it on its own and 
it is therefore important to build networks and improve personal relations… 
The Government is important in opening doors and helping StatoilHydro if 
they get into trouble.   
 
StatoilHydro is in many ways prioritized on political delegations. Umoe BioEnergy has a 
NOK 1 billion investment in bioethanol production in Brazil. It has 1,700 workers and is one 
of the largest Norwegian owned companies in Brazil. In comparison, StatoilHydro (2007) 
had a NOK 174 million investment and just 23 employees in Brazil in 2007. UMOE 
BioEnergy sees the importance and potential of joining the political delegations and it 
requested to join the delegation to Brazil in September 2008; it was met with a negative 
response (27). One reason for not involving UMOE BioEnergy may have been that 
Bioethanol is defined as an agricultural product and not energy, and was therefore not 
considered relevant to the energy and climate delegation.10 
5.5.2 INTSOK 
“INTSOK has an important role in bringing people together by arranging seminars and 
meetings” (source in StatoilHydro (7)).  
 
INTSOK is a PPP that works to internationalize the Norwegian oil and gas industry. It is 
popularly called Konkraft’s brother-in-law.11 INTSOK is 59% financed by the Norwegian 
Government and therefore to be seen as financial support to INTSOK’s members, such as 
StatoilHydro. INTSOK calls itself: 
                                                 
10 The delegation also spent time promoting Bacalao, which is not related to the theme of the delegation (29).  
11 KonKraft is a collaboration forum for the OLF, Federation of Norwegian Industries, Norwegian Association of Ship-
owners and Norwegian Trade Union Federation (LO). The objective of KonKraft is to improve and boost competitiveness 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (see http://www.olf.no/konkraft/category303.html)  
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a network-based organization where the partners exchange experience and 
knowledge of market developments internationally. The organization 
encourages active dialogue between oil companies, technology suppliers, 
service companies and governments. The Norwegian Government actively 
supports INTSOK’s initiatives, and the activities are financed jointly by the 
industry and the Government (www.Intsok.no).12 
 
Jens Stoltenberg, in his previous role as Minister for Oil and Energy, took the initiative to 
start INTSOK (14). When it was established in 1997, it had 45 partners; by 2008 this number 
has risen to 175. In addition to its office in Brazil, INTSOK has offices in Angola, Iran, 
Nigeria, Russia, USA and China (Kristoffersen 2007: 29). The close cooperation between 
Norwegian Governments and industry is said, by INTSOK, to be an advantage for 
Norwegian industry. In a survey performed among INTSOK partners, it was found that they 
believed INTSOK’s role was a little unclear. This opinion was regarding INTSOK’s role in 
the public policy system, the separation of INTSOK as an interest organization for the 
industry and a commercial union (Ihlen 2007:96). 
  
Some argue that INTSOK has changed from being an organization for the big Norwegian 
actors such as StatoilHydro and Aker Solutions to an organization for smaller companies.  
Although there are people who say that INTSOK is not that important for StatoilHydro, I 
argue that it plays a significant role. A source in INTSOK says: 
 
Small companies have very little interest in the fact that Norwegian ministers 
are represented at INTSOK arrangements. However, it can have a positive 
effect for the big companies, like StatoilHydro and Aker Solutions, that 
Norwegian ministers are represented. INTSOK arranges seminars, for 
example in relation to Rio Oil and Gas 2008, where the Prime Minister 
opened the seminar. This is done because INTSOK knows that if Stoltenberg 
is represented, the Brazilian NOC will automatically be represented with its 
leaders. This leads to Norwegian companies getting new customers and 
partners on the other side of the table. Stoltenberg opens a door into a room 
that otherwise could have been hard to access (14).  
 
                                                 
12 For more information on INTSOK: “INTSOK’s objective is to work with companies throughout the industry to 
expand the business activities in the international oil and gas markets on the basis of the industry’s leading edge 
experience, technology and expertise. INTSOK is an effective vehicle for promoting the Norwegian offshore 
industry’s capabilities to key clients in overseas markets and providing market information to its partners. The 
INTSOK team has three main tasks. First, they assess market opportunities and enhance the ability of the partners 
to compete in the global marketplace. Second, INTSOK builds relations between clients and government 
representatives abroad. INTSOK has good access to Norwegian ministers which is used to get their members in 
contact with decision makers at a high political level. Third, they provide information about Norway’s 
achievements in enhanced recovery, cost reduction strategies and Health, Safety and Environment measures.” 
(www.Intsok.no).  
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It is more important to get contacts in Petrobras than in the Government (14). “INTSOK 
members are mainly concerned with meeting their customers” (14).  
 
INTSOK is an organization where the members can use the Norwegian political delegates to 
gain market access. For example, in a report from an INTSOK seminar in Brazil, where 
Stoltenberg was present, it is described that: 
 
INTSOK Partners appreciated the presence of CFO Almir Barbassa and 
Executive Manager on the Tupi field José Formigli. Mr. Barbassa presented 
the challenges in the supply chains for the presalt area and Mr. Formigli 
presented the technological challenges in the Tupi-field. In order to meet with 
these challenges, both speakers welcomed Norwegian companies to explore 
the big opportunities with the presalt development (INTSOK 2008b).  
 
This part has demonstrated the strong political and financial support of StatoilHydro in 
Brazil. This strong support makes it interesting to evaluate StatoilHydro’s activities 
















6. Fundamental differences between StatoilHydro’s and 
the Norwegian Government’s interests  
“It is an illusion that we can go on with our petro-economy in balance with climate 
demands” (WWF 2008b).  
 
Internationalizing StatoilHydro has both positive and negative effects for Norway. The oil 
industry argues that international expansion will give the Norwegian state more income 
through its ownership, it creates employment, and it creates positive spin-off effects in the 
host country (Ihlen 2007:99-100). Norway has an interest in a high oil price, both to achieve 
good value for Norwegian oil and also to accelerate the fight against climate change. 
Increased oil production in Brazil creates a greater supply of oil and therefore a lower price. 
In addition, if StatoilHydro makes a large profit from its activities, this implies that a smaller 
percentage of the income from the oil will be available for the host country. However, 
StatoilHydro’s profit brings little money to the Norwegian Government compared to oil and 
gas development on the NCS. The international activities of StatoilHydro will never be very 
monetarily profitable for Norway (Storeng 2008). Therefore, Brazil will make a large profit, 
which contributes to development. It is positive that StatoilHydro secures large international 
contracts to develop technology for use on the NCS or in politicized cases such as the 
Stockman development. It is also positive that StatoilHydro creates more jobs for Norwegian 
workers. The internationalization of StatoilHydro will give the company `feet to stand on´ 
when the NCS has peaked and production decreases (25).  
 
Ryggvik and Engen, two critics of the oil industry, say that the history of Statoil has been 
turned upside down. “The company that was established to protect Norway against the 
international companies, has now become an international company that others have to be 
protected against” (Ihlen 2007:88).  Ryggvik and Engen (2005) are very critical of the 
internationalization of StatoilHydro because they are picturing a situation where Norwegian 
tax payers have to pay for the company’s failed projects abroad. Furthermore, Ryggvik and 
Engen are concerned with the power the united oil and gas companies represents. Many of 
StatoilHydro’s activities internationally have been NOC-NOC cooperation, which is ironic, 
because one of the arguments for privatization was to get away from the NOC tag.  
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When comparing StatoilHydro’s activity to the targets in the Action Plan, there are some 
interesting findings on StatoilHydro’s direct effect on realized energy and climate initiatives.  
6.1 Increased technical cooperation with rapidly expanding countries 
like Brazil 
StatoilHydro is an important actor in Norwegian-Brazilian cooperation and is therefore 
contributing to increased development cooperation. Significant Norwegian representation in 
Brazil will keep up the sharp focus on Brazil and make it easier to follow up the rain forest 
initiative (source in OLF (25)). However, the commercial business of StatoilHydro and 
Norwegian aid creates a mixture of roles and makes it difficult to separate private and public 
Norwegian actors. StatoilHydro is seen as the long arm of the Government and criticism of 
StatoilHydro will therefore also be regarded as criticism of Norway. The MFA’s book on 
Norwegian interests (Lunde et. al. 2008:139) hints that Norwegian interest might be better 
served if Norwegian companies were allowed the highest degree of elbowroom. This 
argument does not recognise that some Norwegian companies, especially StatoilHydro, can 
be seen as a long arm of the Norwegian Government and therefore can affect Norway’s 
reputation. “To be a responsible environmental nation has for a long time been an important 
pillar in the Norwegian emphasis on reputation” (Ibid:139). This reputation can be damaged 
by being involved in exploitation of heavy oil. However, Hans Olav Ibrekk (2008) in Norad 
argues that the perception of Norway as a leading environmental nation is a myth and part of 
Norwegian priggishness. Knowing that Norway’s reputation is important in politics it should 
also be of interest to learn about the Norwegian environmental footprint.  
 
The footprints are principally made by Norwegian commercial actors, and 
the responsibility therefore, in principle, rests with companies and not the 
Norwegian Government. At the same time, environmental problems are some 
of the most visible expressions for a country’s business activity abroad... 
Partly because we often deal with companies with a considerable public 
ownership, and also companies that enjoy public export subsidy schemes. 
Simultaneously … the difference between the Norwegian Government and 
commercial companies is far clearer in our consciousness in Norway than in 
Government and the civil population in countries like Iraq, Nigeria, Chile 
and Mozambique (Lunde et. al. 2008:140-141).  
 
The impression of StatoilHydro in Brazil will be seen when they start producing and start to 
report on CO2 emissions. There is practically no research on StatoilHydro’s environmental 
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profile internationally that can form a basis for a debate about StatoilHydro’s initiative in 
Brazil.  
 
It is important for the Government to state that Norwegian aid is given with the provision 
that it should be unconditional, which means that the rain forest project does not require 
Brazil to give advantages to Norwegian business actors (Sjøgren 2008). The aid recipient 
does not commit to using Norwegian business (26). However, the recipient will probably 
feel that it wants to pay back Norway in one way or another. Overall, Brazil could get the 
impression that Norway is not helping to make Brazil more climate conscious, but rather the 
opposite. It would be damaging for the bilateral cooperation if Brazil suspects Norway of 
prioritizing hidden business interests. The promotion of the rain forest initiative and CCS 
must be seen as having honourable intentions, and not just being a way of securing 
StatoilHydro’s place in the Brazilian market.   
 
Some argue that there is no conflict between the rain forest initiative and StatoilHydro’s oil 
exploitation (23). However, a Norwegian politician (30) says:  
 
How can the Government support this initiative on rain forest and promoting 
StatoilHydro in a clean way and avoid spill-over effects. It is not possible to 
avoid spill-over effects. When the Prime Minister gives money to the Amazon 
fund, says that Norway will be a leading nation on climate issues, promotes 
CCS and emphasizes that StatoilHydro has a leading position on CCS, it is 
impossible to avoid spill-over effects. Then, when the Government is in Brazil 
to create a commercial window for Norway and StatoilHydro and lists the 
previously mentioned initiatives, this has a tremendous effect on the Brazilian 
view of StatoilHydro.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the rain forest initiative has an indirect positive effect for 
StatoilHydro, but there is no evidence that StatoilHydro lobbied for the initiative. However, 
the problem with the abovementioned spill-over effect is that the Government’s objective in 
initiating this project could be perceived as being a way of giving StatoilHydro a helping 
hand. The Government has a policy to promote all Norwegian business internationally, but 
problems occur if StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil are comprehended as contradictory to 
reducing CO2 emissions.  
 
 57
6.2 Provide better access to reliable energy services 
StatoilHydro contributes to supplying energy to a country in need of energy, also referred to 
as solidarity. This could create social and economic development for Brazil if the oil wealth 
is well managed and Brazil would be better placed to reduce deforestation if it could develop 
an industry with high returns, such as the oil industry. OLF states that “it is a false trail to 
reduce oil and gas activities” because it will stop development and therefore be negative for 
the climate in the long run (25). Norway is not in a position to tell Brazil what it should do 
with its oil. Decreasing exploitation of oil must be a Brazilian choice (34).   
6.3 Enable use of CDM 
Bill Clinton made the framework for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
seeks to encourage industrialized countries to invest in emissions reductions projects in 
developing countries and thereby receive quotas (Tulder and Zwart 2006:321). Selling these 
quotas can strengthen the financing of projects. There are representatives from the 
Norwegian Government and the oil and gas sector working for CCS to become a part of the 
CDM and therefore also part of the aid program (22 and 23). Implementation of CCS in 
CDM would mean that Norway can subtract CO2 reductions made by StatoilHydro in other 
countries (23). Norway is taking part in international lobbying to persuade Brazil to vote for 
implementation of CCS in CDM (34). This is problematic because there is no separation 
between the attempt to convince Brazil to change its mind about CCS in CDM and the 
attempt to sell StatoilHydro’s services. It seems that StatoilHydro has partnered with the 
Norwegian Government in the lobbying process.  StatoilHydro, with its competence on CCS, 
can help the Norwegian Government in convincing Brazil. If they succeed it will enable the 
use of CCS as a mechanism in the CDM, which in turn could lead to more use of the CDM. 
However, this is not necessarily relevant for StatoilHydro’s projects in Brazil. The oil 
industry has promoted CCS as if it is a technological solution that also could reduce CO2 
emissions from the oil industry. This has made politicians and the Norwegian public believe 
that internationalizing StatoilHydro could be an initiative to reduce global CO2 emissions 
and therefore contribute to realizing climate initiatives in Brazil. I argue that by promoting 
CCS, StatoilHydro changes Brazil’s attitude towards implementing CCS in the CDM and 
thus enables the use of the CDM in Brazil, but not in StatoilHydro’s activities.   
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6.4 Increased use of renewable energy 
StatoilHydro has no initiatives on renewable energy in Brazil. By focusing only on oil, 
StatoilHydro is not contributing to better supply of clean energy. Many of its projects 
involve heavy oil, which demands a lot of energy to be produced and therefore leads to high 
emissions. Heavy oil is one of StatoilHydro’s four strategic focus areas and should be seen 
as contradictory to the company’s stated climate profile (StatoilHydro 2008c). Increasing use 
of renewable energy is an area where other Norwegian companies, like Umoe BioEnergy, 
could have contributed. They are however not involved by the Norwegian Government.  
6.5 Increased investment in low-carbon technology 
Involvement in heavy oil in Brazil is not contributing to increased investment in low carbon 
technology. The Norwegian Government and StatoilHydro promote CCS, but CCS is not 
suitable for extracting CO2 from oil. Oil production leads to high CO2 emissions 
independent of CCS. Thus, the environmental profile of oil is limited. See chapter 7.2.3 for 
an in-depth discussion of CCS. In an input to the Action Plan, ZERO13 makes the criticism 
that the priority on increased energy efficiency and cleaner use of fossil fuels is on a par 
with, or in preference to, renewable energy. ZERO argues this is a way of enabling increased 
use of fossil fuels. 
6.6 Improved energy efficiency 
StatoilHydro can contribute to energy efficiency by being more energy efficient in its 
production than other companies. It is argued that the absence of Norwegian companies will 
allow entry for other actors who do not have the same `good behavior´ as the Norwegian 
companies (Lunde et. al. 2008:124). The high environmental standards on the NCS in 
addition to the CO2 tax from 1991 have made the Norwegian oil industry the most 
environmentally friendly. The argument of being the most environmentally friendly oil 
company shows a strategic use of words by StatoilHydro.  If the debate about the 
environmental profile of the oil industry had been conducted on the premise of the 
environmental NGOs, the Norwegian petroleum industry would rather have been referred to 
as the petroleum industry with the least environmental impact. Figure 6.1 shows aggregate 
numbers for oil and gas. Because StatoilHydro is the dominating operator on the NCS, the 
numbers for NCS will be approximately the same for StatoilHydro. OLF argues that Norway 
                                                 
13 ZERO is an environmental NGO. See www.zero.no  
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will have considerably lower CO2 emissions from both oil and gas production individually 
because of the restrictions on flaring (25).  
 
All oil fields also contain natural gas. Flaring of gas is performed primarily as a safety 
measure to prevent dangerous situations, such as blow outs. The excess gas is burned as it is 
released and this process creates significant CO2 emissions. If the oil field has a substantial 
amount of gas it can be sold, stored or be used on the gas power plant on the oil platform. 
However, flaring is responsible for a large share of CO2 emissions and is a normal process 
used world-wide. Norway has strict regulations and CO2 emissions from flaring have 
decreased to some 10% of Norwegian total CO2 emissions (Ræstad 2008). StatoilHydro 
could contribute positively by flaring less than other companies. However, I have not 
succeeded in obtaining estimates for StatoilHydro’s use of flaring in Brazil. Another way of 
reducing CO2 emissions is to use electricity from land rather than gas power plants on the 
platforms, as is done on the Valhall and Ormen Lange fields (25). There are no plans for this 
at Peregrino. The oil and gas industry is responsible for 29% of Norwegian CO2 emissions. 
The power needed on the platform and in production, produced on gas power plants on the 
platforms, accounts for the majority of the sector’s emissions. Emissions from the petroleum 
sector have increased by 80% from 1990-2005, but the emissions per produced unit of oil 
equivalent have decreased by 21%. In comparison, land and air transport was responsible for 
23.7% in 2005 (White paper no. 34 (2006-2007):24, 96, 102). Figure 6.1 presents numbers 
for production, not for consumption of the produced oil and gas.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: CO2 emission from production of oil and gas (Konkraft 2008:60)  
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The difference in CO2 efficiency between the suppliers of oil is primarily due to production 
and transport. Oil production is less energy demanding than gas production, as gas must be 
compressed and cooled down for transport. There is uncertainty about the environmental 
profile of StatoilHydro’s production internationally compared to the NCS. It is difficult to 
compare StatoilHydro’s CO2 emissions per produced unit internationally and on the NCS 
because StatoilHydro is not yet an operator on any large fields internationally. The 
relationship between an operator and an interest holder can be compared to the relationship 
between a driver and a back seat passenger in a car. StatoilHydro is operator on an oil field 
in China, but it is small in comparison to, for example, Peregrino. Peregrino will be 
StatoilHydro’s first large field where it is the operator and could show StatoilHydro’s 
environmental profile in Brazil compared to other companies (35). However, StatoilHydro’s 
numbers for CO2 emissions concern the whole company and the numbers for a specific 
project are not accessible to the public (35). Therefore, it becomes impossible to conclude 
that StatoilHydro as an interest holder or as an operator will influence production having a 
reduced environmental impact. It is therefore not possible for the public to evaluate 
StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil when it comes to emissions. Although StatoilHydro argues 
that its production has less impact on climate, the exploitation of the oil will lead to more 
CO2 emissions than if it did not take place. With this in mind, I argue that StatoilHydro can 
hardly be seen as being involved in a positive climate initiative.   
 
However, energy efficiency can also be meant to be for the consumption element, where 
StatoilHydro does not contribute. The Konkraft report (2008:59) states that “the main CO2 
emission from oil is from the combustion element, which basically is the same independent 
of where the oil is produced. The bar in the middle in figure 6.2 shows that CO2 emissions 
from producing Norwegian oil and gas are minimal compared to the much higher CO2 
emissions from the ultimate combustion of that same oil and gas, the bar to the right. The 




Figure 6.2:Emission from production compared to emission from combustion (Gjærum  2008) The numbers are 
from MFA and the Norwegian petroleum directorate (NPD).   
 
If the relationship between CO2 emissions from production and combustion are even close to 
what is described by Natur og Ungdom, it clearly demonstrates that the climate profile for 
these fossil fuels must not be talked about without focusing on the combustion element. Low 
CO2 emissions from production do not make oil and gas a climate friendly alternative, as the 
oil industry likes to portray them.  
6.7 Summary 
It can be argued that business involvement can be good for development of the country, but 
not if it contributes to climate change. By promoting the environmental profile of 
StatoilHydro it can be seen as a Norwegian policy to use StatoilHydro as a climate initiative. 
There may obviously be some influence from StatoilHydro to make the policy practice more 
focused on oil and gas than the formulated policy intended, but the targets in the Action Plan 
would have been fulfilled to a greater extent without StatoilHydro’s oil activities. 
Internationalizing StatoilHydro could have a positive effect on the Norwegian community 
and host country. However, the problems lie in the lack of clear differentiation between 
private and public, the financial and political support from the Government, the 
contradictions with Norwegian environmental development policy and the threat to 
Norway’s climate reputation. For example, the Norwegian model has been strategically and 
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rhetorically used as a door opener for Norwegian actors. Hansen (2008:7) says that “The 
Norwegian Government can support and help StatoilHydro win international operatorship”.  
 
It can be argued that Norwegian climate policy at some point becomes petroleum policy. 
Solheim (2008d) says: 
 
There is no international climate initiative for the Government to use the 
Norwegian petroleum industry as a climate initiative. I hear that the 
petroleum industry argues that it is a good climate initiative to sell 
Norwegian gas to the world. That must be their argument, but that is not the 
Government’s policy.   
 
My impression is that although there are fundamental differences in StatoilHydro’s interest 
in Brazil and the Government’s formulated policy, the Norwegian Government promotes 
StatoilHydro in Brazil as an agent of Norway’s development and environmental policy. 
Simultaniusly, the Government gives StatoilHydro uncritical, and very positive, feedback for 
their initiatives in Brazil (38). This chapter has argued that the policy practice in Brazil, to 
some extent, is not according to formulated policy and that some elements of StatoilHydro’s 
activities in Brazil are contradictory to the Government’s formulated policy. There can, 
however, be several reasons why policy is not implemented as it is formulated. The 
following chapter will account for the power of StatoilHydro as an explaination for why the 
company is considerably promoted by the Government as an actor in Norway’s energy and 
climate policies in Brazil. The change from policy to practice will therefore be analyzed as 










7. From policy to practice: StatoilHydro’s influence  
“The oil industry is a very political industry of course” (Egset 2008).  
 
Although there are fundamental differences between StatoilHydro’s and the Norwegian 
Government’s interest in Brazil, as demonstrated above, the Government promotes 
StatoilHydro as an agent of Norway’s energy and climate policies. A representative from the 
MFA gives the impression that there has been little reflection around StatoilHydro’s 
influence on Norwegian political practice (11). StatoilHydro does not publicly have a policy 
that aims to influence the process from policy to practice. This chapter will, based on the 
view that StatoilHydro’s activities are contradictory to formulated policy, analyze how the 
company’s power resources and power activities can affect the Government’s decision to 
promote StatoilHydro. Through this analysis I will demonstrate the probability that 
StatoilHydro has influenced the Government to politically support internationalization of 
StatoilHydro in Brazil as a climate initiative.  
 
It seems that environmental policy has a value until it contradicts the interest of money (31).  
I argue that StatoilHydro’s power has led the Government to focus its environmental 
development cooperation in Brazil on internationalizing the Norwegian oil industry. 
StatoilHydro has accomplished this by using two main arguments. First, StatoilHydro states 
that oil is necessary in the future because there are no real alternatives. Producing oil can 
therefore be seen as an act of solidarity because it makes it possible for developing countries 
to further develop. Heidi Sørensen (2008) from the ME states that the solidarity argument 
has been repeated over and over again by the oil industry and the ME therefore becomes 
convinced. Second, StatoilHydro can be a positive climate actor internationally by being 
more environmentally friendly than other oil companies. The industry points out that climate 
must be seen in a global perspective because it is a global problem. For example, gas is more 
environmentally friendly than coal and production and sale of gas will therefore decrease 
global CO2 emissions. Simen Sætre (2008) argues that these arguments are presented with 
ulterior motives. However, there are some negative effects involved in this. Norway has a 
political target to be a leading nation on climate and environment. Contributing to producing 
oil abroad can be seen as contradictory to this. 
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The Norwegian Government promotes all internationalization of StatoilHydro, not just the 
more environmental aspects like gas and CCS. The power channels mentioned in the 
following are explanatory factors that explain how StatoilHydro’s power can have influence 
on the Government’s decision to support internationalization and make internationalizing 
StatoilHydro part of the Government’s practice in climate policy. Through the interviews, 
seven channels stand out as the most important factors that demonstrate StatoilHydro’s 
power: governmental ownership, control of the research agenda, technological power, 
lobbying, network, argumentation and persuasion, CSR and PPP. These channels are 
categorized into TNCs’ two different sources of power. I hope this analysis will add another 
piece to our understanding of the various ways that StatoilHydro holds and exercises 
political power and will therefore have some added value.  
7.1 StatoilHydro’s power resources 
”Votes count, but resources decide” (Rokkan 1987).  
 
Power resources always have to be taken into consideration. The oil industry is by far the 
largest and most powerful industry in Norway and contributes to a large part of the country’s 
value creation (34). Therefore, StatoilHydro has power through being the most important 
creator of wealth in Norway. Austvik (2007) argues this has led the Government to have a 
role as a `junior partner to business´ rather than StatoilHydro being a `junior partner to 
government´. By making a comparison to the renewable energy industry one can see that 
these TNCs have a totally different role than the oil industry. The oil industry still receives 
far more research and development funding than the renewable energy industry. 
Consequently, the oil industry wins the competition for talent and competence in a tight 
labor market (Lunde et al. 2008:208). Jorde (2008) points out that the oil industry is difficult 
to evaluate because it is too technically difficult to find information that the oil companies do 
not want to make public.    
7.1.1 Structural power: governmental ownership  
“We are an international oil company” (source in StatoilHydro (35)).  
 
Does the fact that the state owns StatoilHydro give the company power over the state? 
Intuitivly one would think that the governmental ownership increases the Government’s 
power. However, as a source of structural power, governmental ownership is an important 
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issue to address for several reasons, specifically because of StatoilHydro’s image as an 
NOC. Governmental ownership should be seen as a power resource for StatoilHydro. “The 
strong Norwegian governmental owner interest that is connected to the oil industry should 
not be underestimated” (source in OLF (25)). State owned companies have better access to 
political elites than private companies and it is therefore in the interest of StatoilHydro to be 
partly state owned. As an owner in StatoilHydro, Norway has an interest in the company 
securing as many lucrative concessions as possible where it operates. This also means that 
Norway would have an interest in allying with regimes that give StatoilHydro the best 
concessions. This could be a direct contradiction between Norway’s economic interest and 
the Norwegian environmental development objectives. This contradiction is especially 
obvious when StatoilHydro is operating in countries that receive Norwegian development 
aid. “The consideration of Norway’s and StatoilHydro’s interests has thereby taken priority 
in preference to development policy targets, such as democracy building and fighting 
poverty and corruption” (Sundstøl Eriksen 2007:120). The desire to get a Norwegian oil 
company into a contract limits which political demands Norway can propose (30). Norway 
has little to gain by being associated with StatoilHydro’s criticized activities internationally. 
The planned activities in Brazil are not criticized, but they could be. On the other side, 
StatoilHydro has much to gain by exploiting Norway’s reputation, the NOC label and the 
political support from the Norwegian Government. The governmental ownership arguably 
gives StatoilHydro more power over the Government than the other way around.  
 
StatoilHydro has approximately 30,000 workers compared to the MPE’s 140 employees. 
This demonstrates that there is an imbalance in human resources (StatoilHydro 2008b; MPE 
2008d). It is estimated that Statoil had approximately 50 people working with politics in 
1998, a number which has probably increased (Salvesen 1998)14. When it comes to financial 
and human resources, the size of StatoilHydro is the most important aspect that provides 
power resources (30). StatoilHydro can shape the beliefs of the MPE by explaining how the 
world is seen from its point of view (31).   
 
The MPE, under its section for governmental engagement, has the responsibility to follow up 
the ownership of shares in StatoilHydro. State ownership in StatoilHydro continues to have 
an important function – not least in ensuring that the company retains a firm Norwegian 
                                                 
14 StatoilHydro’s complex organization, combined with the problems of obtaining reliable data, prevents me from 
estimating the number of people in StatoilHydro working directly or indirectly with politics.  
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base. Claes (2008) argues that the state’s ownership makes little difference to the governance 
of the company. The Government does not want to influence StatoilHydro in any way 
because it is afraid of being criticized for `controlling´ StatoilHydro. Norway has no history 
of directly controlling Statoil. It seems to me that there is uncertainty in the political system 
about how StatoilHydro should be handled. One argument for having ownership must be that 
one can influence. The socialist party is engaged in promoting governmental ownership in 
StatoilHydro. However, it is not clear what they want to do with this ownership (Boasson 
2008). StatoilHydro perceives the Government as a passive owner, although the official 
policy is to be an active owner (source in StatoilHydro (15)). A source in the MPE (12) says 
that the state cannot say what it wants StatoilHydro to do. “The MPE never gives advice or 
guidance to StatoilHydro. The meetings we have are follow-up meetings, not in advance of 
StatoilHydro’s investments. We do not plan anything with StatoilHydro. StatoilHydro 
informs us that they have invested in certain projects” (12). Liv Monica Stubholt (2008)15, 
on the other hand, says that the state clearly communicates the Government’s opinion; for 
example on the Canada case. Per Kristian Foss (2008)16 is of a contradictory opinion; he 
argues that the MPE never told StatoilHydro what they meant about the oil sand project, and 
he points out that StatoilHydro obviously never asks for advice about specific projects. Foss 
finds this problematic because he experiences that in some countries “StatoilHydro is seen as 
the Norwegian state”. In this debate it is important to remember that the stock exchange law 
says that all shareholders should be treated alike. All shareholders should know as much at 
the same time (Foss 2008). This is a problem for what can be discussed at the quarterly 
meetings between StatoilHydro and the MPE. I argue that this is a reason to see StatoilHydro 
as the premise provider in this relationship and hence a source of power.   
 
In addition to the quarterly ownership meeting, there are contact meetings with the MPE 
twice a year. These are characterized by a focus on general issues and policy and are said to 
be important for StatoilHydro (15). The state does not have the same opportunities to 
influence a company as private owners have. This is because the state has no representatives 
on the company’s board. This is intended to ensure there is a clear separation between the 
role as owner and administrator on the NCS (Stubholt 2008). Storeng (2008) argues that not 
having a position on the board is an exclusion of liability. However, the MPE has the power 
to fire the entire board.  
                                                 
15 Stubhold works as state secretary in the MPE.  
16 Foss is a former finance minister from the political party Høyre.  
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StatoilHydro is by definition an NOC17 and is therefore internationally seen as a long arm of 
the Norwegian Government. StatoilHydro is perceived as being politically governed.  
 
In many of the countries where StatoilHydro has activities there is a totally 
different relationship between company and state. There is little 
understanding that there is a genuine attempt to clearly separate political 
governance and business in Norway. Therefore, it is a problem that the 
Norwegian state and StatoilHydro are perceived as the same, which is wrong 
(34).  
 
StatoilHydro defines itself as both NOC and IOC depending on the situation (source in 
StatoilHydro (15)). StatoilHydro might have a political bargaining chip when participating in 
such situations (Claes 2003:60).  Lund et al. (2008:125) points out that “the distinction 
between StatoilHydro and the political Norway easily becomes blurred in countries with less 
separation between politics and business. Most people see oil companies based on the model 
in their own country.  
 
Therefore the Brazilian Government will see StatoilHydro as a long arm of 
the Norwegian Government. They will think that StatoilHydro is governed 
like Petrobras, that it is subject to political governance. Most people do not 
understand that NOCs can be that different. Sometimes StatoilHydro can play 
this as a positive element by saying that it is an NOC and should therefore be 
a preferable partner for you because it has the same history and values as 
you. In countries like Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil StatoilHydro has 
strategically used its status as an NOC… Strategically speaking, StatoilHydro 
has a schizophrenic attitude (source in INTSOK (14)).   
 
In addition to the resource imbalance, StatoilHydro has a clear competitive advantage in 
many countries because it is an NOC (30). INTSOK (2008) is of the opinion that NOCs will 
have a more important role in the future. The IEA (in INTSOK 2008) expects NOCs to 
produce 80 out of 120 million barrels per day in 2030. The NOC-NOC cooperation between 
StatoilHydro and Petrobras has been important for StatoilHydro’s success in Brazil (38). 
This implies that one should be more nuanced when studying oil companies. An NOC is not 
necessarily like other NOCs and there is not a clear interface between NOCs and IOCs. 
Domestically NOCs are national instruments and internationally they have larger degrees of 
                                                 
17 Willy Olsen (2008), who works in INSTOK and as a consultant for NOCs, defines all oil companies with more than 34% 
governmental ownership as NOCs.   
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freedom (14).  In addition, the definition of NOC is unclear. Some define them as companies 
with at least 34% ownership, some as those with at least 51% ownership.  
 
Because oil companies are only defined by one variable – governmental ownership – NOCs 
can vary significantly. I argue that because access to licenses and contracts is affected by 
how the host country sees the oil company, it is important to nuance the definition of energy 
companies. One solution is to categorize energy companies according to certain variables. I 
have chosen four variables relevant for Brazil’s understanding of StatoilHydro as an energy 
company. Other characteristics of companies are also relevant (31), but not considered in 
this model. The four selected variables are: activities, CSR approach, political governance 
and governmental ownership. By political governance I mean the home government’s 
influence on the governance of the company. The first two variables relate to the company’s 
commercial activities. The third and the fourth variables relate to the company’s relations to 
its home government.  
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Figure 7.1: Criteria for defining energy companies 
 
According to these categories, StatoilHydro Brazil can be defined as an oil company with an 
active CSR strategy, a low level of political governance and >67% governmental ownership. 
I argue that it is misleading to promote StatoilHydro as an NOC. It is important to note that a 
high level of governmental ownership does not automatically lead to high degree of political 
governance. An NOC is usually perceived as a long arm of the Government, but this is not 
necessarily true. Therefore it is especially important to have knowledge about the 
Government’s ability to influence or control the company.  
 
Some informants argue that StatoilHydro has projects internationally which it could not have 
in Norway. That is typical for TNCs and is politically problematic (31). For example, “when 
StatoilHydro invests in oil sand in Canada it is clearly contradictory to the prioritized goals 
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of the Norwegian Government” (source in INTSOK (14)). This can also apply in the case of 
exploiting heavy oil in Brazil. However, the production of heavy oil does not lead to as much 
CO2 emissions as oil sand. Without considering flaring, the demand for energy to exploit the 
oil will indicate the degree of CO2 emissions from the production element. The CO2 
emissions from production can be described as proportional to the estimated price for when 
it is commercially attractive to exploit the oil from various fields. In the Presalt fields in 
Brazil the estimated cost is USD 40-50 per barrel which means a substantial demand for 
energy and therefore also high CO2 emissions.  
 
Jorde (2008:3) states that “Norway also has a unique opportunity with the ownership in 
StatoilHydro to create an energy company that develops new and environmentally friendly 
energy instead of searching for oil and gas”. This would make Norway into an energy nation 
rather than an oil nation. However, this is not seen in Brazil, where the focus is on oil.18 
Therefore, in the case of internationalizing StatoilHydro the governmental ownership should 
be re-evaluated. There are different arguments prevailing concerning StatoilHydro in 
Norway and StatoilHydro abroad. In order to more clearly identify StatoilHydro’s role, the 
Government could promote more privatization or more governmental ownership. Further 
privatization would lead to a clearer split between the role of the Government and the role of 
StatoilHydro. If StatoilHydro was fully privatized, the Norwegian Government would not 
have responsibility over StatoilHydro’s action and it would not weaken Norway’s reputation 
as an environmentally leading nation. One of the main arguments for being a shareholder in 
StatoilHydro is to make sure that the head office is situated in Norway. However, this can be 
secured by having one-third of the shares, termed minority control. As demonstrated, the 
argument for owning StatoilHydro is weakened because its activity conflicts with Norwegian 
environmental policy (Foss 2008).19 Two-thirds ownership in StatoilHydro is only relevant 
in having control over the articles of incorporation. Consequently, the percentage ownership 
is not vital for the Government but for how StatoilHydro is perceived (14). Making 
                                                 
18 The same effect can be reached by the Government Pension Fund – Global (GPFG). GPFG can strategically use 
investments towards renewable energy and by doing this use the profit from the oil industry to reduce climate problems. 
Today, GPFG has around 100 times more investment in fossil fuel industry than in renewable energy (Lunde et. al. 
2008:130). 
19 The money from selling StatoilHydro could be placed in the GPFG, which can invest the money in accordance with 
Norwegian environmental development policy. In places like California and the Netherlands there are developed climate 
funds where one can invest in projects in developing countries that reduce climate emissions (PCC 2008:59). There is a 
growing debate about how to invest the money in the GPFG and there is a split between those who want strategic 
investments in environmentally friendly industry and those that are afraid of politicizing the investments in the GPFG 
(Lunde et. al. 2008:115). 
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StatoilHydro a fully state owned company is another solution.20 The Government could use 
StatoilHydro actively to fulfill policy targets for energy and climate policy. Today the 
management of StatoilHydro runs the company without considering Norwegian 
environmental development targets.  
 
Based on this analysis, I argue that StatoilHydro has substantial power through its 
governmental ownership. I emphasize the resource imbalance and the contact with the MPE 
as especially important channels for StatoilHydro’s power resources. The promotion of 
StatoilHydro as an NOC is also key for its activities in Brazil because it leads to more 
cooperation with Petrobras, and the Brazilian Government already knows the benefits of 
NOCs. The case illustrates the need to re-evaluate the way energy companies are defined. It 
also gives reason to conclude that governmental ownership in StatoilHydro should be re-
evaluated. Further, politicians need more information and objective facts becasue the power 
of StatoilHydro has, to some extent, given it control over the research agenda, which in turn 
has led to a lack of independent research into the oil industry. 
7.1.2 The power of knowledge: controlling the research agenda  
“There is a lack of public debate about the Norwegian oil industry” (politician (34)).  
 
In an input to the Action Plan, the Research Council of Norway argues that independent 
research is necessary to rationally improve environmental development work. There is, 
however, no independent research on StatoilHydro’s role in Brazil. In total, there is little 
independent research on the Norwegian oil industry despite the fact that it has become the 
most important Norwegian industry. Most of the research has been financed by the industry 
itself and there has therefore been an objective for the researchers to design a research 
project which the industry believes will be of value to them; if not, then other researchers 
will be prioritized (19). “The oil industry has power in that it has the resources to carry out 
studies and present the documented material in whatever way it believes it should be 
presented” (25). With some exceptions, the highest level of independent research into the oil 
industry is at a master’s level (professor (31)). On the other hand, Stein Tønnesson (37), 
contributor to the Research Council’s Petropol project, argues that the researchers who were 
financed by Petropol had full independence. However, he points out that research where 
                                                 
20 Practically, the Government can use the money from GPFG to make investments in StatoilHydro instead of in the 
international financial market. This will affect the governance of StatoilHydro, but this will have a small impact on the 
national economy (Ryggvik and Engen 2005:54). 
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StatoilHydro is the subject should not be financed by StatoilHydro. He also points out that 
the Research Council is becoming too `user dominated´, meaning that the research 
representatives form a minority of the members in the program committee. A contra example 
to StatoilHydro’s control of the research agenda is that the World Wildlife Fund has applied 
for financial support by the MPE to undertake an evaluation of StatoilHydro’s possible 
effects in Alaska (WWF 2008). This is meant as contra presentation to what StatoilHydro 
presents (30). There is no such research on StatoilHydro in Brazil. The MFA has never done 
any work to study the influence or the political role of TNCs because it is a difficult 
phenomenon to get clear evidence about (source in MFA (11)). Moreover, the merger of 
Statoil and Hydro has reduced the Government’s ability to use the competitors’ resources in 
research. There is a need for competitive environments because two competing companies 
give politicians access to contra expertise, contra arguments and information (34).  
 
Some informants argue there is a lack of critical journalism on StatoilHydro and too few 
journalists focusing on the oil industry. Dagens Næringsliv has been one of the frontrunners 
in creating a group that focuses on these issues (Ryggvik 2008; Lindeberg 2008). 
StatoilHydro’s life is made easier when most research is financed by the oil industry and the 
media has only small numbers of staff working in the area. For example, at Topplederforum 
on 21 October 2008 there were only three journalists present. If journalists were interested in 
the real issues in Norwegian oil policy there would have been more press at the event (34). 
However, if someone amasses a great deal of knowledge about the industry, they are likely 
to be recruited by it, probably at a higher salary. The lack of public debate leads to increased 
freedom to act for the industry and lack of counterclaims for politicians (34). Further, 
journalists sometimes have financial support from various interest groups. Traditional press 
is often owned by trade unions, organizations or associations, which can influence its 
independence. Another example is that the MFA has spent almost NOK 800,000 in the last 
three years on press grants to journalists that join Solheim on his international travels. The 
press’s dependence on grants can affect how critical they are because they want to make sure 
they continue to get new grants (Næss Olsen 2008). There were some critical journalists on 
the Norwegian political delegation in September 2008. However, the journalists did not have 
background knowledge about the oil industry. For example, no questions were asked about 
the Government and StatoilHydro’s promotion of CCS, which is of little relevance for 
StatoilHydro in Brazil.   
 73
7.1.3 Technological power – CCS in Brazil?  
“Business’s control and ownership of energy technologies, and its ability to draw on 
technological expertise and know-how in the contest of negotiations, constitute an important 
source of power” (Vormedal 2008:61).  
 
StatoilHydro has received international recognition for being a front runner on CCS. For 
example, the head of the CCS division has received the prize for `Green Man of the Year´ 
(source in StatoilHydro (35)). This section analyzes how StatoilHydro uses its technological 
power position to make the Government promote StatoilHydro’s technology, on for example 
CCS, as a climate initiative in Brazil. A large part of the Norwegian population probably 
believes CCS is a technological solution which will substantially reduce CO2 emissions from 
the petroleum industry. This is not entirely true because CCS potential is overrated and I 
argue that CCS is of little relevance for StatoilHydro in Brazil. It is important to know the 
different aspects of CCS, which basically are capture, storage and transport. The following 
will explain why CCS has little relevance for reducing the CO2 footprint from offshore oil 
and, therefore, little relevance for StatoilHydro in Brazil.  
 
Capturing CO2 from the combustion process is relevant for gas and coal fired power plants. 
Capturing can be divided into three main categories: post-combustion, pre-combustion and 
oxy-fuel.  
 
Post-combustion entails separating CO2 from the exhaust gas from the power 
plant using chemical cleaning. Because CO2 is separated from the exhaust 
gas, this technology can, in principle, be utilised in existing power plants 
without major modifications of the plant itself. Post-combustion is considered 
to be the most mature technology, although there is still significant 
uncertainty surrounding its use. With the aid of pre-combustion technology, 
CO2 is captured before combustion… With oxy-fuel, combustion takes place 
in the gas turbine with pure oxygen instead of air. This means that the 
exhaust contains water vapour and CO2, and the CO2 can be separated out 
by cooling the exhaust (MPE 2008). 
 
There are two locations in Norway relevant for capturing CO2 in the combustion process – 
gas at Mongstad and coal in Svalbard (33). Pre-combustion is relevant for oil if hydrogen is 
separated from the carbon and oxygen and used instead of other petroleum products in 
transport. Oil is a very special resource because there are no real alternatives to it. The only 
alternative is to make hydrogen from the oil. Consequently, there is almost no climate profile 
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for oil and the CO2 footprint from oil is difficult to reduce. Post-combustion and oxy-fuel are 
not relevant for offshore oil exploitation if the energy used is produced on the platform. CCS 
technology has for some time been argued to be relevant for the gas power plants on 
platforms because a platform requires a great deal of power. However, there is no CCS 
technology used in gas power plants on platforms today and Arvid Sande (2008) in Beyond 
Petroleum states that there is no longer a hope of using it in the near future. The power 
demand from a platform can be compared to the power demand from a small Norwegian 
town (Ræstad 2008). The alternative to a gas power plant at each platform is to supply power 
from the mainland, as is done at Valhall and Ormen Lange (25). 
 
CCS is more important for the mainland industry than for the oil industry 
offshore. The technology for post-combustion capture of CO2 is so expensive 
that it will probably not be used on a large scale on platforms and in offshore 
production. It must be used on large point emissions on land… However, it 
will probably be many years before the technology is ready to be used on land 
as well. CCS has the best potential for coal (OLF (25)).  
 
Post-combustion can be relevant for reducing CO2 from oil refineries, but this is not relevant 
for StatoilHydro in Brazil.  
 
CO2 must be transported from the CO2 source to the geological structure where it will be 
stored. This transport can be accomplished by pipeline or by ship. Transport is the least 
complicated element in the CO2 chain and transport of CO2 is already used in commercial 
activities (MPE 2008). CO2 can then be stored in oil fields and injected to enable enhanced 
oil recovery (EOR). StatoilHydro has extensive experience in storage of CO2 in geological 
structures. Since 1996, one million tons of CO2 per year have been separated from gas 
production on the Sleipner Vest field in the North Sea for storage in Utsira, a geological 
formation 1,000 meters below the sea bed (MPE 2008). The natural gas from Sleipner has 
too high a percentage of CO2 to be sold as it is, therefore it needs to be separated. The CO2 
tax that was introduced in 1991 made this a commercial success, because of the high cost of 
releasing emissions in Norway. This has made the CCS project at Sleipner one of the longest 
CCS project in operation (21). Norway is the only country with a CO2 tax, which means that 
there are not the same incentives to use CCS abroad (StatoilHydro 2008). CCS technologies 
are not commercial at the outset, but can be made commercial with proper regulation. There 
is significant technical potential for storing CO2 in geological formations around the world. 
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For example, storage in reservoirs that are no longer in operation is a good solution in terms 
of geology because these structures are likely to be impermeable after having held oil and 
gas for millions of years (MPE 2008). However, CO2 is very aggressive and can break 
through (33). There are no plans for StatoilHydro to store CO2 in Brazil and the separation 
technology is not transferable from gas to oil exploitation. 
 
As demonstrated, CCS does not make oil significantly more environmentally friendly 
because it leads to little reduction of CO2 from oil production. In addition, based on figure 
6.2 I argued that the CO2 footprint of oil is very little affected by CCS. “The majority of 
CO2 emissions from oil come from the combustion element, which is relatively equal 
independent of where the oil is produced” (Konkraft 2008). 
 
The relatively low CO2 emissions from StatoilHydro’s Norwegian oil and gas production are 
mostly due to regulation on flaring of gas and the CO2 tax. Norway, Sweden, Denmark and 
the Netherlands are the only countries with policies in place to stop flaring (23). In addition, 
the reason Norway’s oil and gas industry is seen as more environmentally friendly is because 
of the focus on EOR (21). In Norway it is normal to exploit 50% of the oil in the field; in the 
rest of the world this percentage is substantially lower, maybe as low as 25%. EOR can be 
achieved by injecting gas or water to keep up the pressure in the field. EOR leads to the 
cheapest and most energy efficient oil because of the large start up cost for each oil field, but 
mature fields demand more energy per produced unit (Sjøgren 2008).   
 
Thus, StatoilHydro claims it is a more environmentally friendly solution than other 
companies. “Oil production has a negative effect on climate. But the production of oil in 
Norway has better, or less detrimental, climate effects than in other countries” (MFA (10)). 
However, because StatoilHydro has not been an operator internationally there are no 
numbers for its CO2 emissions per produced unit of oil internationally compared to in 
Norway which can prove that StatoilHydro’s production has a less impact on climate than 
other companies (25). “The influence from other interest holders on the operator’s decisions 
and choices considering environmental solutions will vary” (25). Therefore, StatoilHydro’s 
international activities will not necessarily be more environmentally friendly. However, a 
source in the ME (23) argues the opposite. He points out that in the case of oil sand in 
Canada, some environmentalists have said that there has been more focus on environmental 
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aspects since StatoilHydro came in. StatoilHydro has a stronger perspective on environment 
than Canadian companies.  
 
The MPE (20) states that CCS is a technology which is directed mostly towards downstream 
industry, such as gas power plants and places where fossil fuels are burned and there are 
large single point emissions. There are some 7,500 relevant point places for CCS (24). This 
is the case for both gas and coal, which are resources that are used for power generation. Oil, 
on the other hand, is not used in the same way. Oil is mostly used in transport and the 
emissions are spread over many points. If one wants to reduce CO2 emissions from oil, the 
transport sector is the most important. Oil has certain characteristics and is utilized in such a 
way that it does not fit with the requirements for using CCS, which is that there must be a 
large single point emission.  
 
If CCS is only used in gas production, and this is what Norway wants to promote, there 
should be more internationalization of the gas sector. StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil do 
not involve gas. Most people do not know that CCS is used in gas exploitation and is almost 
irrelevant for the oil industry. This means that the promotion of CCS in an agreement to 
internationalize the oil industry can be based on false arguments. CCS has been a way of 
legitimizing the oil industry, it has been a way of `greenwashing´ StatoilHydro. 
Greenwashing is described by Greenpeace (2008) as “misleading consumers regarding the 
environmental practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a product or service”. 
It involves a company promoting an environmental program or product, a marginal part of 
its business, while the corporation's product or core business is inherently polluting or 
unsustainable. This can be argued to be the case for StatoilHydro’s use of CCS technology.  
 
It is difficult to demonstrate that the oil and gas industry has misinformed the public about 
the use of CCS. However, CCS is indirectly presented in connection with oil. For example, 
at Statoil’s CCS presentation at the Oslo conference on good governance and social and 
environmental responsibility, the slide show ends by saying that CCS is expected to become 
an important element in meeting the global climate challenge. This conclusion is next to a 
picture of cars driving under a bridge where it is written “It’s global warming stoopid” 
(Statoil 2007). This is a way of connecting CCS to oil, because cars usually use oil products 
and are responsible for high CO2 emissions. It can be said that the information flow from the 
oil industry about CCS and its usefulness for the oil industry has been so unclearly 
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(elegantly) presented that even Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg says the following about the 
paradox of oil exploitation on one hand and the rain forest initiative on the other hand: 
 
It is a paradox, but it is among the paradoxes we must solve. The most 
important challenges that humankind is faced with are poverty and global 
warming. We must solve both. To help the world’s millions of poor one needs 
energy. Simultaneously, the emissions must decrease. This is a challenge in a 
world where energy demand and energy consumption are increasing. The 
answers are carbon capture and better emissions handling in the oil industry, 
and initiatives like those against deforestation in the Amazon rainforest (in 
Giæver 2008).21  
 
The problem is that this is probably how the Norwegian oil industry is promoted by the 
Norwegian Government in Brazil. Evidently, there are people in the MPE that know that 
carbon capture and emission handling has little or no practical effect on oil exploitation. So 
why does Stoltenberg promote StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil as a climate initiative?  
 
Stoltenberg is not the only one connecting CCS to oil. Solheim also mixes up the areas 
where CCS has a potential of being a climate contributor. Solheim says: 
 
I understand the critics of CCS, who maintain that it is wind, solar and other 
renewable forms of power that are the future and that we should rather focus 
on developing these. But I believe that oil, gas and particularly coal will 
remain the main sources of energy for many years. And that it is therefore 
vital to develop the technology for capturing and storing the emissions 
produced (Solheim 2008b).  
 
Furthermore, Labor party politician Marianne Marthinsen (2008) says that “CCS is 
important because the economy will be oil based in years to come. And we need to find ways 
to capture CO2”. Academic work also lacks a clear separation between the oil and gas 
industries when dealing with CCS. Vormedal (2008:51-52), which has studied the influence 
of business and industry NGOs in the negotiation of implementing CCS in the CDM, writes 
the following: 
 
                                                 
21 Stoltenberg did not respond when confronted with the questions about what he meant about the connection between CCS 
and StatoilHydro in Brazil.  
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The fact that CCS offers the opportunity to continue using fossil fuels without 
significant CO2 emissions makes it an attractive solution for the oil, gas and 
coal sector… Thus, companies and BINGOs representing the fossil fuel 
sectors have a vested interest in seeing CCS recognized as a mitigation option 
within the climate regime.      
 
However, it is not supprising that CCS is perceived as important for StatoilHydro Brazil. 
Through the Corporate Communication efforst from the headquarters the company took 
initiative to convince the Government to promote StatoilHydro’s climate profile in Brazil. 
Simultaniusly, StatoilHydro states that it has never informed the Government that CCS is of 
little relevance for its activities in Brazil (source in StatoilHydro (38)). StatoilHydro wants to 
portray CCS as the solution for mitigating climate change and hence legitimize its activities. 
Technological power can in this aspect also be regarded as both agenda setting and 
discursive power because StatoilHydro is forming the ideas, beliefs and focus of relevant 
actors. Vormedal (2008:59) argues that technological innovation capacity and knowledge 
gives TNCs power to influence. The CCS case illustrates how StatoilHydro’s influence may 
be conceptualized as a form of `technological power´. Norwegian industry is very optimistic 
and believes that technology will be the climate solution (Norsk Industri 2007). That 
Government also adopts this positive technological view indicates that the voices of the 
industry are being heard. Also, the actual technological opportunities to develop climate 
friendly energy in the oil industry must become a reality. StatoilHydro and the oil and gas 
industry as a whole are typical examples of knowledge-intensive and innovation-based 
business.  
 
To talk about the oil and gas industry as the petroleum industry is a simplification and is the 
reason for this false connection between CCS and oil. In a climate discussion, the oil 
industry should be considered separately from the gas industry because of the large 
differences in the two. The oil industry gains by being seen in the same boat as the gas 
industry because it is the oil industry that faces the biggest problems in reducing climate 
emissions. However, the technological and environmental profile of the gas industry shows 
the oil industry in a good light because the two industries are seen as one. Taken to the next 
level one could call it the `energy industry´. This would involve oil, gas, coal, wind, and 
other renewable energy sources. When a company like BP (Beyond Petroleum) chooses to 
be involved in all types of energy sources it could be a ploy to use its activity in more 
climate-friendly energy in order to make its oil activities also look more environmentally 
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friendly. It is like sailing with the wrong flag and I argue this is a form of greenwashing. 
Therefore, when discussing this one should deconstruct the large collective terms and make a 
separation between the oil and gas industries and see if the two industries have viable 
individual climate profiles. Furthermore, there should be a separation of onshore and 
offshore oil. Onshore oil projects often use energy from land, where CCS can be used to 
reduce CO2 emissions. For example, StatoilHydro claims that it wants to use CCS on the 
new oil sand project in Canada. Moreover, the energy industry stands out as one industry 
with different portfolios. I argue that the exploitation of oil business should be separated 
from the power generation industry, especially when discussing climate profile, because 
CCS is most relevant for power generation. I argue that the technology for power generation 
facilities is used indirectly as marketing to legitimize other types of activities such as the 
exploitation of heavy oil in Brazil.     
 
As demonstrated above, CCS cannot be used to separate CO2 from oil in the same way that 
it is used to separate CO2 from gas. However, CCS is used to promote StatoilHydro’s oil 
exploitation activities. StatoilHydro actively uses uncertainty and lack of knowledge about 
the technology to its advantage. This technological power can have influence on the 
Government’s decision to use StatoilHydro as an agent for Norway’s energy and climate 
initiatives in Brazil.  
 
The most important knowledge to take from this part is the need to differentiate between 
exploitation and power generation; oil and gas production, and offshore oil must be treated 
separately from onshore oil when dealing with CCS. In addition, the technology on CCS is 
not fully developed. Solheim (2008d) points out that “we are only at the beginning of 
developing the technology for CCS. In the world today there is way more talk about CCS 
than action”. The IEA report on CCS (IEA 2004:3) reveals that “large-scale uptake of 
capture and storage technologies is probably ten years away, and without a major increase in 
research and development investment, the technology will not be in place to realize its full 
potential in the coming decades”. Morover, Greenpeace (2008b) argues StatoilHydro’s 
technological power is contributing to giving a false hope to how CCS can be a climate 
solution.22    
                                                 
22 Greenpeace’s report has six main arguments for why CCS will not save the climate:(1) CCS cannot deliver in time to 
avoid dangerous climate change, (2) CCS wastes energy, (3) Storing carbon undergrouind is risky, (4) CCS is expensive, 
(5) CCS carries significant liability risks, and finally (6) there is high uncertainty concerning CCS.   
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7.2 StatoilHydro’s power activities  
7.2.1 Lobbying 
”The oil industry is one of the best and most professional lobbyists” (politician (30)).  
 
The common understanding is that traditional lobbyism is directed towards politicians 
because they make decisions. For example, OLF has a strong focus on the representatives in 
the Norwegian parliament (30). Salvesen (1998) says that when Statoil’s policy differs from 
Norwegian policy, the company uses lobbying to change the Norwegian policy. The 
existence of lobbying by Norwegian companies is well described and mapped in 
Gulbrandsen’s (2008) comprehensive study23. However, the effect of lobbying towards 
politicians has proven hard to demonstrate.  
 
There has lately been some work on the power of the oil industry on Norwegian domestic 
politics (Kristoffersen 2007; NRK 2008). The work has especially concerned the roles of 
Topplederforum and Konkraft. Topplederforum and Konkraft are now separate entities, to 
separate private and public concerns. A politician (34) says: “The fact that this separation did 
not happen until now illustrates that there has been an influx mix of roles between the 
industry and the public administration for a long time”. However, the role of 
Topplederforum is argued to be over-exaggerated and misunderstood in the public domain 
(34).  
 
The Petroleum and Energy Minister does not need to be in the hands of the 
oil industry. The Minister has to take the whole picture into account, but can 
of course decide who he wants to listen to… There is however a system for 
checks and balances because the Minister for Petroleum and Energy will be 
confronted by the Minister for the Environment, who gets his information 
from other sources (34).  
 
The oil industry has specifically been criticized for its lobbying in the tax case in 2004.24 
However, the political decision was taken against the interest of Konkraft and proved that 
lobbying from the oil industry has its limits (30). It is said that interest organizations, like 
OLF and INTSOK, have the most important role in lobbying, not the independent firms (23). 
This implies the importance of INTSOK, Konkraft, OLF and Prosessindustriens 
                                                 
23 Gulbrandsen’s study is based on data from The Leadership Study 2000 which involved 1,710 interviews with leaders in 
Norwegian society. The response rate among the private business leaders was 74.8%.  
24 See Kristoffersen (2007) and NRK (2008)  
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Landsforening (PIL). However, StatoilHydro, as an independent company, has influenced by 
emphasizing the positive effects and the possibilities of internationalization. Lobbyism is 
also directed towards bureaucrats. StatoilHydro (15) argues that its contact with bureaucrats 
is as important as its contact with politicians. The MFA (11) argues that there is little 
lobbying towards the bureaucracy. However, a source in the MPE (26) argues that “a 
ministry does not necessarily know where the influence is coming from. It could come from 
several degrees away”. In this study, there are no empirical data which give reason to believe 
that the Government has taken any action in Brazil that it would not have done without the 
traditional lobbying from StatoilHydro. 
 
StatoilHydro does not just lobby its home government, but simultaneously participates in 
policy processes in Brussels and in Washington. This is typical practice among TNCs (Fuchs 
2007:72). This is a source of TNCs’ power and explains political mobilization by 
StatoilHydro, because it will eventually influence the Norwegian political system (Ibid:90). 
An informant from StatoilHydro’s office in Brussels says that the dialogue with the EU 
authorities is easier than with the Norwegian Government. There are more workshops and it 
is easier to get in contact with EU decision makers (15). However, “the higher costs of 
representation at the supranational level and the complexities and fragmentation of 
supranational governance make the successful exercise of instrumental power difficult for 
small interest groups; they do advantage the resource-rich interest groups over poorer ones” 
(Fuchs 2007:95). StatoilHydro may have a representative in important climate negotiations 
(23), but the companies are usually represented through interest organizations. Evidently, 
StatoilHydro has a significant focus on lobbying.  
 
Another form of lobbying is through inputs to political processes. StatoilHydro has not been 
active with inputs to the Refleks project. Aker Solutions, which to some degree has the same 
objectives as StatoilHydro, emphasizes three main arguments in its contributions (Hansen 
2008). First, Norway should focus on being a dependable oil and gas exporter. Second, 
Norwegian technological development is one of the most effective instruments to handle the 
climate threat. Third, Norway should promote itself as an environmentally friendly energy 
exporter. These three arguments are adopted by bureaucrats and repeatedly used in the MFA 
report Norske Interesser (Lunde et. al. 2008). These arguments are also used by politicians, 
for example by Stoltenberg when he was in Brazil in September 2008 (journalist 29).  
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Lobbying also takes place at political delegations. There is considerable potential for 
StatoilHydro to influence the Government at these delegations. I have, however, not been 
given access to what has been said in meetings between StatoilHydro and Government 
representatives at these delegations and I therefore have no empirical data to indicate the use 
of political delegations as a power channel. A politician (34) says that “there are smarter 
ways to influence than through traditional lobbying”. As a consequence, lobbyism is not as 
important for StatoilHydro as its informal contacts (31).  
7.2.2 Network power  
“It would have been very interesting to have more in-depth studies on informal networks. 
But then you have to get on the inside and go through with an investigation. However, it is 
worrying that a high degree of power is exercised through a system that one knows little or 
nothing about” (Øyvind Østerud in Lundgaard et. al. 2008).  
 
Network contact will here be defined as all contact which is not specific or case-based 
lobbying (Gulbrandsen 2008). StatoilHydro’s network and contact with government 
representatives are complex and difficult to follow. Officially, StatoilHydro has one person 
responsible for governmental contact, Gunnar Myrvang. However, there are many 
StatoilHydro employees who have various forms of contact with the Norwegian 
Government. Internationally, the land director is responsible for contact with representatives 
from the Norwegian Government, which means that Jorge Camargo is responsible for 
governmental contact for StatoilHydro’s activity in Brazil. In addition, the communication 
department also has governmental contact.  
 
A developed network culture demonstrates that network power is critical for StatoilHydro. 
The network culture is especially developed in Norway because it is a small and 
homogeneous country. “Network is important in Norway to get in contact with decision 
makers and sell the products” (26). There are traditions of cooperation between the 
Government and the industry. Historically, there has been close connection between 
StatoilHydro, bureaucrats and the Labor Party (32). Støre and Stoltenberg come from an oil 
industry influenced network, which makes it easier for them to talk about StatoilHydro’s 
activities and environmental policy at the same time. Stoltenberg, the current Prime Minister, 
was previously the Minister of Petroleum and Energy. This historical connection to the MPE 
and the oil industry has given oil and gas easier working conditions. StatoilHydro has ready 
 83
access to people at a high political level in Norway. For example, StatoilHydro can directly 
contact the OPM and arrange meetings at a high political level without the MPE even 
knowing about the contact (34). The contact with bureaucrats has been argued to be 
important for StatoilHydro’s lobbying. Bureaucrats probably also have an important role in 
networks and informal contact because politicians are highly influenced by their 
administration. The close contact between business and bureaucrats has led to business 
people being referred to as streat-level bureaucrats.  
 
In addition, people often move from jobs in the Government to positions in industry, and 
vice versa (10). People circulate from industry, politics and academia. They have many hats. 
The people in the petroleum industry are faithful to the industry and when one moves into a 
government position or organization they bring with them the morals and thoughts of the 
industry. Former representatives from the oil industry move to other positions in society 
where they can use their influence and fight for the rights of oil and gas. Also, the petroleum 
industry has employed many former politicians and bureaucrats who know how to get things 
through the political system (Kristoffersen 2007:25).25 It is not illegal or wrong in any way 
to employ former politicians or bureaucrats, but it is an important issue to be aware of. For 
example, the official governmental contact person in StatoilHydro, Gunnar Myrvang, has 
been a political adviser for several governments formed by the Labor party and worked as 
state secretary in the MPE. In addition, Helge Lund, the CEO of StatoilHydro, has a 
background as a political adviser; he worked for Høyre which is in opposition today. 
Another example is the Labor Party politician Anne Kristin Sydnes, who for some time was 
Director of Statoil’s division on human rights work and land analyses before she became 
Minister for International Development in 2000. StatoilHydro needs people that know the 
political system and have a network. It can be argued that employment of former politicians 
and bureaucrats creates a better understanding of the state by StatoilHydro. There is a wider 
understanding of the other actor’s position which minimizes the distance between state and 
market.   
 
The political elite and the business elite meet several times a year, for example at the annual 
dinners arranged by Norges Bank and NHO (36). Politicians also participate at many 
StatoilHydro events, for example at the ONS conference in Stavanger. “These conferences 
                                                 
25 Gulbrandsen’s (2008:9) study show that 7% of private business leaders had worked one year or more in politics, and 18% 
in public administration.  
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have a mix of representatives from business, government, academia etc.” (10). The 
Sandefjord meeting is also an arena where the oil industry has events that provide arenas for 
interaction between business representatives and the political elite. It is a good opportunity 
for StatoilHydro to present its view on different issues (30). This is also a way of courting 
favour. At these events, StatoilHydro can control the setting and the presentation of 
information. This is also seen in the close relationship between StatoilHydro and politicians 
on the political delegations to Brazil. Furthermore, OLF regularly invites politicians to 
industry events (OLF 2008b;c). Politicians say that environmental concern pushes the oil and 
gas industry out. That is, however, not the impression that was given at ONS in Stavanger. In 
2008, 25 young politicians were invited to visit ONS with OLF. OLF says that “the objective 
of the gathering was to give young politicians insight into the most important industry in the 
country” (OLF 2008). The focus on creating networks and contact with the political elite, as 
well as youth politicians illustrates the importance of networking for the oil industry. I argue 
that StatoilHydro has substantial power activities through its networks. Networks and 
informal contact are arguably more important channels of power than traditional lobbying 
for influencing how StatoilHydro is promoted by the Government. Network power is to 
some extent an invisible form of power because it is impossible to know what influences the 
decision makers. The power of arguemtnation and persuasion can also be perceived as an 
invisible mechanism.  
7.2.3 The power of argumentation and persuasion 
“You are dependent on having a generally positive reputation in the public opinion. It does 
not help to convince the politicians if the people are of a different opinion” (source in OLF 
(25)).  
 
There is a great deal of influence through argumentation and persuasion. For example, 
sustainable development is a highly discussed concept. Concerning energy, some have said 
that it is not sustainable to use fossil fuels at all.  Others say that we can use some fossil fuel, 
but we have to develop technologies for the next generation. The basic message is that we 
should not “put future generations at a lower level of ability to meet their need than the 
present generation” (Crane and Matten 2007:499). This view on sustainable development 
can be experienced as threatening for StatoilHydro. There is also an industrial approach to 
sustainable development, also referred to as the argument about being the cleanest actor in a 
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dirty business (Støre 2007). In Statoil’s sustainability report from 2004 (Statoil 2004:3-4) it 
says: 
 
Based on scientific material, Statoil understands that production and 
consumption of fossil fuels can represent a liability for our surroundings, 
among other factors like global warming. At the same time, it is unrealistic to 
picture development in the next 30-40 years without oil and gas as the 
dominant energy carrier. Our responsibility therefore becomes to minimize 
the unwanted effects from our business activities. This is done by, for 
example, systematic work to reduce emissions to air and water.  
 
By definition, the oil industry is  not sustainable because it exploits a non-renewable 
resource. Also, the implications from exploiting and using oil involve a high level of CO2 
emissions. One way that the industry can stay sustainable would be to use the profit from 
fossil fuels to develop renewable energy. That way, the oil and gas industry will change into 
an industry of renewable energy, such as indicated by BP, which now calls itself “beyond 
petroleum”. One can see this as a way of using the oil and gas to hand over an industry of 
renewable energy to the next generation. StatoilHydro promotes its different investments in 
renewable energy, such as offshore wind and the pilot project on wave power in Portugal 
(Kullerud 2008). However, critics say that the percentage of investments is so low in this 
area that this is just a commercial stunt.  
 
StatoilHydro has a large staff working on issues relating to communications, CSR, 
government contact and representation in many forums. These forums include Konkraft, 
Topplederforum, INTSOK, Kompakt and the Energy Council. Topplederforum is an arena 
where the oil and gas industry as a whole can influence through persuasion and 
argumentation. They produce reports and present their view on different issues. In addition 
to these forums, StatoilHydro is often present at different conferences and other arenas 
where it can express its views and be in contact with the society as a whole. There is 
probably much truth in the saying that if you repeat something enough times, people will 
start to believe it. It is important to remember that the Norwegian oil industry is perceived as 
environmentally friendly although the Norwegian industry has a negative reputation for its 
international activities. One reason could be the way the oil industry argues for its 
environmental profile. Sigbjørn Aanes (2008) from OLF said at Globaliseringskonferansen 
in Oslo that “one barrel of oil produced in Norway leads to five times less CO2 emissions 
than a barrel produced in Africa”. For those who have background information about 
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emissions from oil it is obvious that Aanes refers to the production element, but for others it 
could be understood as CO2 emissions from Norwegian oil are radically lower than from oil 
produced elsewhere. This type of argumentation and persuasion takes place at various 
conferences and forums and leads to a misunderstanding of the climate profile of oil.  
 
StatoilHydro claims that the criticism of the company is stronger on its home field, in 
Norway, than at the place where the activities take place (Ihlen 2007:82). StatoilHydro 
laughs this off by saying that “it is impossible to become a prophet in your own country” 
(Utengen 2008). However, it can also be seen as entirely natural that StatoilHydro receives 
totally different feedback in Norway than where its activities take place. This is because 
there is an increasing focus on ethics in Norway in general, and in the media in particular. 
StatoilHydro has activities in some countries where there is not even a free press and where 
the critics have to be careful about what they say to avoid being sanctioned (Bergan 2008). 
 
StatoilHydro uses the media actively to express its views. Bellona has criticized 
StatoilHydro for commercials that it says paint a misleading picture of the company (in 
Wang and Sundset 2008).  The consumer ombudsman has concluded that StatoilHydro 
violated the Marketing Practices Act in its commercial campaign in autumn 2008. The 
decision was taken against StatoilHydro because “it is wrong for a company whose main 
activity has serious environmental consequences to use environmental symbols in its 
marketing” (in Blindheim and Sæbø 2008). INTSOK (2008) advises using experience from 
oil and gas production to develop renewable energy. Consequently, Norway should 
internationalize the oil industry to develop renewable energy. This is not the case in the short 
run. StatoilHydro promotes itself as working on wind power and other renewables, but the 
alternative energy part of the company budget does not reflect the time devoted to this area 
in its commercials. StatoilHydro is not involved in any renewable energy projects in Brazil. 
There are, however, possibilities for StatoilHydro to be involved in renewable energy by, for 
example, cooperating with UMOE BioEnergy’s on its bioethanol project in Brazil. Tor 
Steinum in former Hydro (in Ihlen 2007:113) emphasizes that the work with solar energy 
and other alternatives energies is an important part of the company’s reputation building 
activity. He describes it as an important defense mechanism for the company. Moreover, 
StatoilHydro has also been criticized for giving the impression that it is more involved in 
environmental initiatives and research than it actually is. StatoilHydro has used extensive 
resources to better the reputation of the oil industry, for example through Konkraft (16). By 
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doing precisely this, StatoilHydro has managed to perpetuate a long held belief among large 
sections of the Norwegian public and Norwegian politicians that Norway’s interests are the 
same as the interests of the Norwegian oil industry. 
 
Kristoffersen (2007) points out that the industry has managed to make its interests stand out 
as being common interests for the nation. Tore Slaatta (2005) says that during the work on 
the Petropol project on the oil industry’s reputation, surveys showed that there is great 
support in the Norwegian population for the oil and gas sector’s goals and that the 
Norwegian population believes that Norway, as a rich oil nation, has a particular 
responsibility for the development of poor countries (NPD 2005). Kristoffersen (2007:23) 
describes the internationalization of StatoilHydro as “the Norwegian oil fairy-tale continuing 
abroad”. The Government is going towards a policy where they want Norway to be seen as a 
“climate conscious exporter of fossil fuels”, with a “special role as a climate conscious oil 
nation” (Lunde et. al. 2008:114,149). These could easily have been the words of the oil 
industry. 
7.2.4 CSR and PPPs as power instruments 
“A CSR project is a project outside commercial activities that seeks to demonstrate that 
StatoilHydro is a prudent company” (source in StatoilHydro (15)).  
 
CSR, or corporate integrity and social responsibility (CISR), as StatoilHydro calls it, is a 
focus area for the company. By promoting self-regulation, CSR and PPP, StatoilHydro can 
set the rules and standards for the game and they argue that by having these systems there is 
not the same need for state regulation. CSR is an attempt to say that StatoilHydro will fix 
things themselves (31). Crane and Matten (2007) argue that business ethics begin where the 
regulation stops. Thus, the more business ethics, the less regulation. Some critics of self-
regulation claim it is done mainly to prevent extensive and internationally binding regulation 
and agreements. StatoilHydro tries to avoid these agreements by showing that it can 
“maintain order in its own home” (Ihlen 2007:176). If the Government wants StatoilHydro to 
contribute in realizing Norwegian development objectives as they are formulated in policy 
documents, such as the Action Plan, there need to be incentives, not just vague guidelines. 
Input to the Action Plan argues for a need for better systems for evaluation and reporting 
which correspond to more concrete and measurable targets. Successful politics needs 
instruments (15).  A businessman (27) says that “the industry will find solutions if the 
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framework conditions are in place. Let the politicians make the regulation and let the 
business make it happen”.  
 
Bull and McNeill (2007:166) discovered through their study that many employees of the 
CSR departments of TNCs often have the same sort of background as their counterparts in 
multilateral organizations or in governments. Ditlev Simonsen (2008) sees CSR as a part of 
the commercial and reputation building of the company, which is usually developed by the 
information department. In StatoilHydro, the government contact, Gunnar Myrvang, is 
responsible for the sustainability report.  
 
StatoilHydro says that they use the same standards abroad as they do in Norway. “At least, 
that is what is said in the after-dinner speeches, and that is what the aim should be” (34). The 
environmental profile is focused on the company as a whole, not on the specific activities of 
the company. Ræstad (2008) says that his impression is that the base organization is 
concerned with external environmental effect, but the personnel in the fields are only 
concerned about EHS (Environment, Health and Safety). The CSR work is so centralized 
that individual projects do not get the same attention. I argue that there should be an 
individual CSR approach for each project. StatoilHydro does not even report on the 
environmental effects of individual projects (35). It is obvious that the CSR approaches 
differ from project to project. A project with lower environmental standards should not 
benefit from the centralized CSR reputation of the company. For example, CSR is important 
for StatoilHydro in Brazil, but the company has a low environmental profile there by not 
focusing on renewables, which is part of the centralized CSR reputation. OLF argues that it 
is a legitimate ambition for StatoilHydro to be at least as environmentally friendly as its 
competitors (25).  However, a Norwegian politician argues that “Norway should not do 
something that we are against just because we believe that StatoilHydro does the job in a 
more environmentally friendly manner than other companies” (30).   
 
The example Global Compact (GC), where corporations can associate themselves with the 
UN in their image campaigns, demonstrates how StatoilHydro can use PPPs to its own 
advantage (Fuchs 2007:113). GC is an inter-organisational network where private actors are 
incorporated in a dialogue on CSR. It is a bottom-up organization which is based on 
corporations (Ruggie 2002). Critics have pointed out that the GC may allow corporations to 
gain prestige from cooperation with the UN system and the use of the UN logo for their 
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image campaigns without actually making substantial improvements to their environmental 
or social practices (Fuchs 2007:113). As a member of GC, StatoilHydro can meet TNCs in 
the same situation and use the forum to learn how to use CSR strategically. The GC is an 
example of a PPP where business holds substantial power and where business and industry 
may dictate agenda and rule setting (Ibid:114). The effect on StatoilHydro of being involved 
in GC can be seen when politicians point out that they have noticed the company’s positive 
involvement in international arenas concerning CSR (Støre 2007).26 A source in the MFA 
(26) says: “it is my opinion that companies are genuinely interested in environment and work 
conditions”. Therefore, “the embassies try to sell Norwegian business by focusing on quality 
and social responsibility” (26). 
 
As already mentioned, StatoilHydro has a CSR project in Brazil. More important is the base 
organization’s promotion of CSR as a reputation builder. It can be argued that StatoilHydro’s 
promotion of CSR has convinced the Government to promote its products as climate friendly 
and sustainable. I have demonstrated StatoilHydro’s activities directed towards the political 
system, politicians and bureaucrats, and the Norwegian population. These are all examples 
of power channels where StatoilHydro executes its power activities. I argue that this 
discussion strengthens H1.  
7.3 Summary 
“Very few have access to the data and experience which StatoilHydro has” (StatoilHydro 
(7)).  
 
Based on this analysis I argue that StatoilHydro has considerable power in each of the power 
dimensions. First, StatoilHydro evidently has strong power resources because of its 
governmental ownership, its control of the research agenda and its technological power. I 
argue that the promotion of StatoilHydro as an NOC is misleading and has improved 
StatoilHydro’s market share in Brazil. Controlling the research agenda has led to a lack of 
independent research, and the promotion of CCS is greenwashing and is helping 
StatoilHydro to establish a reputation as a Norwegian climate actor in Brazil. Second, 
StatoilHydro holds and uses its highly developed power activities towards the whole of 
                                                 
26 In addition to the membership in GC, Hydro has had a longstanding leadership in the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development and Statoil ranks first among international oil and gas companies on the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index – and has done so for the last three years in a row (Støre 2007). 
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society, not just politicians. I argue that lobbying is not as important a channel for power as 
network power, power of argumentation and persuasion, and CSR and PPP as tactical 
instruments. Network power and power of argumentation and persuasion stand out as 
important power channels for StatoilHydro and should be further studied and scrutinized. 
These channels are difficult to analyze in a manner that produces hard evidence because 
these are invisible mechanisms. In both dimensions, discursive power stands out as an 

























8. Conclusions and implications: The power to influence  
“Today’s problems cannot be solved by thinking in the same way as when we created them” 
(Albert Einstein in Innbjør 2008).  
 
From this analysis I have reached some interesting findings. First, the illustration of the 
promotion of CCS has demonstrated a misuse of the company’s technological power. CCS 
has, as argued, been sailing with a false flag and therefore also given false hope and 
expectations. For example, academics write that “CO2 capture has the seductive 
characteristic of uniting economical and climate policy targets, because use of this 
technology legitimizes and make possible further expansive exploitation of oil, gas and coal” 
(Vormedal 2008b). This is how most people understand CCS, but I have showed that CCS is 
of little relevance for StatoilHydro’s oil production in Brazil. Second, following the CCS 
debate, I emphasize that there should be a clearer separation between exploitation activities 
and power generation activities because CCS is significantly more relevant for power 
generation. It is also crucial to differentiate between the environmental profiles of oil and 
gas. The industry has clearly been promoting the environmental profile of the whole 
petroleum industry based on the environmental profile of gas. Furthermore, when discussing 
CO2 emissions and CCS for the oil industry there should be a separation between offshore 
and onshore oil production. At minimum, production units that use land based energy should 
be separated from those which do not.   
 
Third, I also would like to point out that the promotion of StatoilHydro as a company which 
produces oil in a climate friendly way compared to other companies is overrated and not 
demonstrated internationally. This is due to that StatoilHydro is not yet an operator and that 
it does not publish emission numbers for specific projects. In addition, the CO2 emissions 
from production are a limited part of the CO2 footprint of oil, which mainly relates to 
combustion.  Fourth, the case of StatoilHydro in Brazil has demonstrated that StatoilHydro 
benefits from being defined as an NOC. I have demonstrated that the definition of an NOC is 
very wide and they can therefore be very different. An energy company’s access to resources 
depends on how the host country sees, or defines, the company. Therefore, I propose a new 
way of defining energy companies which is more nuanced than today’s NOC – IOC 
classification. By using a more nuanced classification the host country is better capable of 
knowing what characteristics the companies have.     
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I started this thesis by presenting my research question: What can explain the Norwegian 
Government’s promotion of StatoilHydro as an agent of Norway’s energy and climate 
policies in Brazil inspite of their different goals? In answering the research question this 
thesis has discussed theoretically, and investigated empirically, StatoilHydro’s influence on 
the decision to be promoted as an agent of Norway’s energy and climate policies in Brazil. 
Chapter 5 and 6 clearly outlines how the Government focuses on promoting StatoilHydro in 
Brazil in spite of the fundamental differences in StatoilHydro’s and the Norwegian 
Government’s interests, which is demonstrated by comparing StatoilHydro’s activities to the 
policy targets in the Action Plan. In chapter 7, I presented StatoilHydro’s power based on my 
data collection. It should therefore be pointed out that there could be other relevant channels 
for power, which for some reason have not come up as important in my data collection. I 
argue that StatoilHydro’s power has given influence in the process from formulated policy to 
practice. Furthermore, chapter 7 emphasizes that the company’s power has contributed to 
make possible StatoilHydro’s activities in Brazil as we see them today. The theory 
concerning StatoilHydro’s power resources and power activities have been used as an 
analytical tool to illustrate that StatoilHydro has power and that power is an explanatory 
factor for why StatoilHydro is promoted as a Norwegian climate actor.   
 
To understand how TNCs influence public policy, it is important to study their rhetoric, 
institutionalization, knowledge and competence, networks, reputation and especially their 
power (Ihlen 2007:183). I conclude that StatoilHydro holds power and uses this power. It 
cannot be concluded that StatoilHydro has had direct influence on the governmental decision 
to promote StatoilHydro as a Norwegian agent in realizing energy and climate initiatives in 
Brazil. However, based on the assumption that power leads to influence I argue there is good 
reason to believe that the governmental decision to promote StatoilHydro is related to the 
company’s power. StatoilHydro’s power resources and power activities are clearly important 
explanation factors for why the company is promoted as an agent of Norway’s energy and 
climate policies in Brazil. I argue that StatoilHydro has substantial power influence on the 
Norwegian Government. Consequently, I conclude that my hypothesis, H1, is strengthened 
through this analysis.  
 
These conclusions have some implications for the Norwegian Government’s desire to 
involve StatoilHydro and other TNCs in environmental development projects. TNCs can, as 
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pointed out in the case of StatoilHydro, have positive effects on the development of 
developing nations. Industry and business are essential for social and economic 
development. A developed business sector is especially important to make the country 
independent of traditional aid and assistance. These are mutual gains for all actors in the 
triangular diplomacy and prove that involving TNCs in development work can take the 
Norwegian development initiatives to the next level. There is also a business case for 
cooperation with home government because TNCs have much to gain by being promoted by, 
and associated with, the Norwegian Government. However, when TNCs are involved in 
national development programs, the separation between public and private becomes unclear.  
 
I have argued that this mix of roles is problematic, but is unrealistic and almost impossible to 
avoid. For example, Norwegian embassies’ role is to promote Norwegian public interests in 
addition to promoting Norwegian business interests. The embassies’ role is therefore 
inherently a mix of public and private. If there is little political will to change the role of the 
embassies, Norway should focus more on clearly explaining this situation to the involved 
parties in the host country. Involving TNCs demands a clearer demonstration of Norway’s 
approach to development work. TNCs must be understood and treated as commercial actors, 
based on the knowledge that they are powerful profit-seeking enterprises. There is little 
possibility for home government to influence TNCs on a project level because the host 
country has to be in control of specific regulations in its own country. Some informants 
argue that government must place more demands on the companies, but it is extremely 
difficult for the Norwegian Government to tell another country what is in its own best 
interests and how it should run its affairs (34). Consequently, the home country’s influence 
on TNCs must be the paramount requirement. One of the important factors that influences 
what climate strategy the oil and gas companies choose is found in the political context of 
their home country. Skjærseth and Skodvin (2001 in Ihlen 2007:103) argue that social and 
political pressures are regarded as the most important driving forces for climate 
considerations. However, the resource imbalance between large TNCs and the home 
government can turn this assumption upside down. By this I mean that it could be argued 
that the national climate strategy can be affected by the large TNCs that are dominant in 
Norway, such as StatoilHydro. This is in accordance with Linda Weiss’ theory about the 
state as a service station for TNCs.      
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Further, I argue that one of the most important implications of involving TNCs is that TNCs’ 
power must be thoroughly studied and understood. Invisible power mechanisms, like 
discursive power, agenda setting power and greenwashing, are the most dangerous ones if 
underestimated. StatoilHydro has, as argued, substantial power and therefore potential for 
influence through various power channels. Other TNCs probably also have influence on the 
Norwegian Government. TNCs power and influence can be a problem if not dealt with, but 
as long as the invisible mechanisms for influence are exposed, there is a greater possibility of 
a positive outcome from involving TNCs. The Norwegian Government must focus on 
aggregated Norwegian interests and follow its formulated policy. If the Government believes 
that TNCs will contribute positively to reaching its policy targets, TNCs should be invited to 
have a role in realizing Norwegian energy and climate targets.  
 
“Norway has four international instruments of significance; The Government Pension Fund-
Global (GPFG), StatoilHydro, development aid and the power of the example…StatoilHydro 
invests enormously internationally in activities that are contrary to official targets for 
Norwegian climate policy” (WWF 2008b).  Norway’s key vulnerability is in undermining its 
reputation by StatoilHydro’s investment in projects that would seem to undermine Norway’s 
international values. The Government has to make a clear guide for how they want 
StatoilHydro to develop. If there is a desire to create an energy company that develops into a 
`beyond petroleum company´ the Government has to make sure that StatoilHydro focuses 
more on renewable energy. Practically, the Government can do this by making public 
strategy documents and white papers to parliament which outlines the desired development 
targets for StatoilHydro. However, StatoilHydro does not want this discussion and will 
probably work against such political involvement in the governing of the company. 
Furthermore, the Government will always have a `pain limit´ of what it can accept from the 
oil industry. The uncritical enthusiastic rhetoric about Norway being a green nation in a 
polluting world could backfire if the gap between rhetoric and reality becomes too big 
(Lunde et al. 2008:148). I hope Støre’s Refleks project will become a turning point, and 
therefore also a starting point, which leads to a more congruent Norwegian environmental 
development policy. The Norwegian Government has to align its policy practice with its 
formulated policy before Norway can give the impression that it is a united green country 
trying to save the world from global climate change.  
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9. List of Acronyms 
BINGO - Business and industry NGOs  
CCR – Corporate Climate Responsibility 
CCS – Carbon Capture and Storage  
CDM – Clean Development Mechanism  
CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility 
EOR – Enhanced Oil Recovery 
GC - Global Compact  
GPFG - Government Pension Fund – Global 
IEA – International Energy Agency 
IOC – International oil company 
ME – Ministry of the Environment 
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MPE – Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
MTI – Ministry of Trade and Industry 
NCS – Norwegian Continental Shelf 
NGO – Non-governmental organization  
NHO - Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises  
NOC – National Oil Company 
NPD - Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
OLF – The Norwegian oil industry association 
OPM – Office of the Prime Minister 
PIL - Prosessindustriens Landsforening  
PPP – Public-Private Partnership 
SD – Sustainable Development 
SDFI - State’s Direct Financial Interest  
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11. Appendix 1: Observation  
 MFA’s sustainable development conference in Oslo in February 2008 
 Meeting between MFA, Norad and INTSOK in Merethe Nygård’s office 
 Topplederforum 27.05.2008 and 21.10.2008 
 Energirådet 26.05.2008 
 Kompakt 17.06.2008 
 Conference at Norad about companies’ role in aid and the Brazilian rain forest fund 
 Conference by NORISS and Respublica 28.08.2008 
 The Policy Coherence Committee’s launch of their report at Litteraturhuset 
 Two-day seminar about Norway in the petroleum industry. Arranged by Petrad. 1.-2.09.2008 
 EITI seminar about oil companies at Litteraturhuset 23.09.2008.  
 INTSOK’s day in Stavanger before ONS 25.08.2008 
 Natur og Ungdom’s conference at Chateau Neuf October 2008 
 Globaliseringskonferansen in Oslo in November 2008 
 Meeting with the unit for public relations in the MFA where I got insight into documents 
relating to the Action Plan. These documents are referred to as input to the Action Plan.   
12. Appendix 2: Interview theme guide   
TNCs’ role in development work  
Norway and StatoilHydro in Brazil and the relevant actors 
Norwegian climate initiatives in Brazil 
StatoilHydro as an agent for Norway’s climate initiative 
Evaluating INTSOK, the Norwegian embassy and political delegations 
General impression of the role of StatoilHydro and its power resources and power activities: 
1. Structural power: Governmental ownership 
2. Control of the research agenda  
3. CCS on offshore oil production 
4. Lobbying 
5. Network 
6. Argumentation and persuasion  
7. CSR and PPP 
Further advice? 
